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Leonard S. Goodman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
AT the close of the 1960's, the Interstate Commerce Commission was attacked from several quarters. One of the more lengthy 
studies of fts work was performed by a group of students under the 
direction of Robert C. Fellmeth and Ralph Nader. Other regulatory 
agencies were visited by similar groups organized by Mr. Nader; and 
"Nader's Raiders" became a familiar newspaper phrase. The bulky 
Study Group Report resulting from their inquiry into the Commis-
sion's achievements was published in 1970 under the title The In-
terstate Commerce Omission: The Public Interest and the ICC.1 
The authors did not mince words in expressing their displeasure 
with the Commission's work. The chapter concerning freight rate 
regulation they entitled "The Rate Rape."2 This chapter followed 
nearly 150 pages of invective. Within its pages, a reader would find 
no discussion of the Commission's accomplishments in the field of 
rate regulation. Ironically, the title of the book seemed to describe 
the authors' apparently conscious effort to publish with omissions. 
The simplistic picture of rate regulation presented in the Report 
overlooked the complexity of the Commission's responsibilities. The 
prices for transportation service in interstate commerce are reflected 
in millions of rates, each of which applies for the carriage of particu-
larized commodities between named points. These rates are on file 
with the ICC, but only a few were established, or prescribed, by the 
Commission. Furthermore, the railroads, the truckers, and other 
modes of transportation regulated by the ICC typically file 300,000 
new tariffs each year. Few of these tariffs are contested, and but a 
handful become the subject of formal proceedings.3 Even so, there 
• Associate General Counsel, Interstate Commerce Commission. B.A. 1954, Penn-
sylvania State University; LL.B. 1957, Harvard University.-Ed. The views expressed in 
this Article are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission or its Office of General Counsel. 
1. THE RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT ON THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COM• 
MISSION AND TRANSPORTATION, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION: THE PUBLIC INTER-
EST AND THE ICC (1970) [hereinafter STUDY GROUP REPoRT]. 
2. Id. at 126-90. 
3. 85 ICC ANN. REP. 3 (1971). However, when general rate increases that may affect 
a large number of rates for many carriers are filed, the Commission normally will re-
quire formal proceedings. 
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were still approximately 1,000 rate proceedings before the Commis-
sion in fiscal 1971.4 
What these statistics reflect is the often-forgotten fact that the 
interstate rate structure has always been basically a system of "carrier-
made" rates. When regulation began, the Commission had no rate-
fixing authority.5 Today such broad authority exists; but the basic 
duties under the Interstate Commerce Act remain those of the car-
riers: to file and th~reby publicize the rates they hold out to the pub-
lic, and to maintain just and reasonable rates.6 
Despite this partial autonomy in the carriers, the trend in their 
rate structure has tended more and more to a cost orientation. This 
is illustrated by the comparison below of revenues and out-of-pocket 
costs of the different commodity groups: 
RAno OF RAILROAD REvENUES 
TO OUT-OF-POCKET Cosrs7 
Commodity Group 1939 1947 1961 
Products of agriculture 135 121 118 
Animals and products 125 106 111 
Products of mines 178 132 10'7 
Products of forests 153 127 11'7 
Mfg. and misc. 203 165 149 
Total carloads 1'72 141 128 
The movement followed the direction of cost-pricing for reasons 
quite apart from the ICC's regulation of rates. Increasing competi-
tion among the modes of transportation and new methods of packing 
determined the trend; the Commission, at most, molded its contours. 
The object of this Article is to describe the trends in the Com-
mission's work during the 1960's in some of the areas of rate regula-
tion that could not be settled by mere reference to costs, and in other 
areas of changing rate policy. This was a prolific period for the Com-
mission, one that involved many rate innovations and a sense of new 
direction in certain aspects of rate regulation. The present discus-
sion of the Commission's rate work is in no sense complete; and there 
is no intention to make it so. By emphasizing the decisions of the 
recent decade, I hope to introduce the reader to the substance and 
4. Id. Table 1, at 105. 
5. See Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379. 
6. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(4), 1(5), 6, 316, 905, 906, 1004 (1970). 
7. See ICC Bureau of Accounts, Distribution of the Rail Revenue Contribution ny 
Commodity Groups-1961, Statement No. 6-64, at 3 Oune 1964); ICC Bureau of Ac-
counts, Distribution of the Rail Overhead Burden By Commodity Groups-1939 &: 1947, 
Statement No. 2-49, at 9 (April 1949). 
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trend of the more controversial aspects of today's regulation of freight 
rates. There will be no discussion, of course, of matters still pending 
before the Commission. Nevertheless, the very substantial pending 
investigations of the railroad rate structure8 and of the railroad rate 
base0 further attest to the vitality of rate regulation today. 
II. THE CONSIDERATION GIVEN VALUE OF SERVICE 
The Study Group Report includes a particularly harsh vilifica-
tion of the Commission's adherence to "value of service" rates and 
rate-making over the years. It finds this theory of rates, which calls 
for reduced rates on low-value commodities and correspondingly 
higher rates on high-value commodities, responsible for a host of 
weaknesses in the railroad industry and in the economy of the coun-
try.10 The Report suggests that value of service perhaps assisted in 
the development of the West, but that today a departure by the rate 
maker from "considerations of cost" is unfair and uneconomic.11 
Since the rate structure is largely the product of carrier-made rates, 
let us first turn to the factors impelling carrier management to em-
ploy value of service. The rate structure, it is true, includes elements 
of value-of-service pricing. However, can we assume, as the Study 
Group Report seems to do, that these elements are present only as a 
result of ICC policy? Or does the very nature of value-of-service 
pricing ensure that the rate structure will contain an irreducible 
minimum of such rates? 
A. By Carrier Management 
The value-of-service principle is basically a procedure for distrib-
uting elements of cost. It is derived from transport economics, not 
social policy.12 Professor Sharfman ·wrote that value of service, when 
properly used, was the appropriate principle under which the "total 
costs" were apportioned to the various classes of traffic all "to the 
end that movement of tonnage may be promoted." He stated that 
"the problem is essentially one of apportioning the total cost bur-
den," and only "maladjustments in the apportionment of transporta-
8. Investigation of Railroad Freight Rate Structure, Ex parte No. 270 (I.C.C., ini-
tiated Dec. 11, 1970). 
9. Net Investment Railroad Rate Base, Ex parte No. 271 (I.C.C., initiated Dec. II, 
1970). 
10. STUDY GROuP R.EPoRT, supra note 1, at 146-54. 
11. Id. 
12. On the other hand, there is nothing inherently fair about charging the same rate 
per hundred pounds for high-valued cargo, which can readily afford a higher rate, and, 
let us say, scrap or fertilizer. 
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tion costs create the necessity for regulation."13 Thus he recognized 
that although certain variable costs were assignable to specific traf-
fic, there was no one obviously correct method for apportioning the 
constant or joint costs. As the staff of the Commission has written, 
"there is no justification from a 'cost of service' standpoint for 
apportioning any more of these joint costs to any one unit of output 
resulting from the joint operation than to any other unit of output 
from the same operation."14 The staff therefore concluded that "the 
distribution of the constant and joint costs must take into considera-
tion the value of the service or conditions of demand."16 
The railroads were of the same view as the Commission's staff, but 
perhaps for different reasons. During the nineteenth century, they 
recognized the many choices available in apportioning the constant 
and joint costs. At the same time, they perceived an opportunity to 
maximize their profits by promoting the movement of traffic. As a 
result, by reducing some rates while at the same time retaining high 
rates on traffic willing to pay such rates, the railroads were able to 
attract traffic that would not othenvise move, at least not by rail. 
Professor Daggett, therefore, defined value of service in terms 
of a theory of demand; that is, what would a shipper be "willing 
to pay." He inferred a greater "utility" of transportation in the 
higher price any particular purchaser of transportation would pay.10 
Similarly, Professor Locklin defines the phrase "value of service'' 
as "the highest charge that can be levied without preventing a ship-
ment from moving."17 
Criticizing this ability of the railroads to price their services dif-
ferentially, the Study Group Report asserts that value-of-service pric-
ing reflects only monopoly power; but it also concedes that the "rail-
roads supported the structure because it ma."illllized profits."18 In its 
invective, the Report apparently overlooks the fact that profit-ma.xi-
mizing is rational decision-making behavior, and not necessarily a 
13. ill-B L SHARFMAN, THE lNTERsTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 440-42 (1936). See 
also R. WE5I'MEYER, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 244-45 (1952). Sharfman pointed 
out that to apply properly value-of-service pricing there must be an independent de• 
termination of the desirable amount of transportation services. III-B I. SHARF.MAN, 
supra, at 427-29. 
14. ICC Bureau of Accounts, Cost Finding and Valuation Section, Explanation of 
the Development of Motor Carrier Costs with Statement as to Their Meaning and 
Significance, Statement No. 4-59, at 12 (Aug. 1959). 
15. Id. at 14. 
16. S. DACGEIT, PRINCIPLES OF INLAND TRANSPORTATION 363 (1928). 
17. D. LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 146 (6th ed. 1966). 
18. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 148. 
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sign that monopoly profits are being made. Moreover, the Report 
fails to comprehend that in the presence of a regulated monopoly, 
value of service can make economic sense. In an article published in 
1962, ten well-known economists strongly supported the railroads' 
system of differential pricing.19 Among their words of encourage-
ment were the following: 
Differential pricing is consistent with the public interest in the 
economical utilization of resources. It can yield significant benefits 
to the users of rail services by encouraging the retention of traffic 
and the development of greater traffic volumes and improved profits, 
thus fostering the adoption of improved technology and service, as 
well as lower rates.20 
Value-of-service pricing exists to the extent that it does essentially 
by consent. It exists under the rate agreements among the carriers. 
They recognize that by this means they are able to increase utiliza-
tion and profits.21 The existence of value-of-service pricing, there-
fore, would possibly work less well in the absence of the price-fixing 
permitted by section 5a22 of the Interstate Commerce Act; but it 
would not disappear. The railroads surely would recognize that it 
is self-defeating, with respect to maximizing their profits and utiliz-
ing their facilities to the fullest, to drive all above-average rates 
down toward cost and all below-average rates up to a full-cost level. 
The freight-rate structure today reflects less value of service than 
it did prior to World War II. Nevertheless, the concept is still highly 
relevant in the efforts of carrier management to maximize profits. 
B. By the ICC 
What we have seen is that there are sound economic reasons for 
carrier management to retain the value-of-service principle in the 
rate structure. What is more, the statute administered by the ICC 
also gives recognition to this principle. Section 6(1)23 of the Inter-
19. Baumol, Bonbright, Brozen, Dean, Edwards, Hoover, Pegrum, Roberts, Wil-
liams &: Behling, The Role of Cost in the Minimum Pricing of Railroad Services, 35 
J. Bus. U. Cm. 357 (1962). 
20. Id. at 363. 
21. Curiously, the Report recognizes that value-of-service pricing was a "highly 
beneficial" part of the nineteenth century rate structure, and yet concludes without 
citation that the railroads' failure to adhere to cost was the precise type of "discrimi-
nation" that the Commission was "originally formed to prevent." STUDY GROUP REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 147-48, 169. 
22. 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1970). 
23. 49 u.s.c. § 6(1) (1970). 
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state Commerce Act requires the railroads to file tariffs with the 
Commission that set forth not only the transportation rates, but 
also any rules and regulations affecting the value of service. The 
Act specifically requires the Commission to consider "the effect of 
rates on the movement of traffic" when it prescribes rates.24 This 
seems to imply that some rates should be set lower than others on 
grounds other than cost considerations. 
The references to value of service in the provisions of the statute 
governing motor carriers are more numerous. Both the tariff-filing 
section and a rate-making section of the statute include specific 
references to "value of service."25 At the same time, the statute 
preserves the reference to the effect of rates on the movement of 
traffic.26 The motor carrier provisions in Part II27 of the Act in fact 
reflect the accumulated experience incurred under Part I, 28 which 
applies to railroads. In addition, both parts of the Act require rail-
roads and motor carriers to establish and observe reasonable "classifi-
cations" of property;29 this requirement is at least an oblique 
reference to the value of the service. 
The Study Group Report implies that the Commission, through 
its approval of rates reflecting the value of the service, gives the rail-
roads and other carriers a free rein to establish whatever rates the 
traffic will bear;30 but the Commission early resolved that rates estab-
lished under value-of-service principles would not be permitted to find 
their own level completely divorced from regulation. That is to 
say, the Commission did not equate "value of service" with "what 
the traffic would bear." Rather, it attempted to impose "govern-
mental limitations ... upon the unlimited and arbitrary discretion 
of traffic officials."31 A few illustrations of the Commission's work 
and of some of the criteria developed in bringing value-of-service 
pricing to bear would perhaps best illustrate this last point. 
24. 49 U.S.C. § l!fa(2) (1970). 
25. 49 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 317(c), 318(a) (1970). 
26. 49 U.S.C. § 316(i). The water carrier and the freight fonvarder sections of the 
Act also prohibit the carrier's extension of "any privileges or facilities for transporta-
tion affecting the value thereof except such as are specified in its tariff." 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 906(c), 1006(c) (1970). 
27. 49 u.s.c. §§ 301-27 (1970). 
28. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-5, 5b-27 (1970). 
29. 49 u.s.c. §§ 1(6), 316(b) (1970). 
30. See STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 148-49. 
31. Railroad Com.nm. of Nevada v. Southern l'ac. Co., 19 I.C.C. 238, 249 (1910). The 
Commission was governed by "what the traffic can reasonably be required to bear"; the 
Commission has "never recognized" that charging what the traffic will bear "has any 
place in public regulation." Mountain-Pacific Oil Cases, 192 I.C.C. 599, 636 (1933). 
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I. Cost Considerations 
The issue of value of service has been raised explicitly in only a 
few cases. Thus it is easy to overemphasize the role of value of service, 
as the Study Group Report constantly does. Furthermore, the Re-
port wholly fails to consider that when the Commission was presented 
with a value-of.service question and given a choice to follow cost 
or value-of-service considerations, it followed the rule that favored 
lower rates. For example, the value of one commodity might be 
higher than that of another related commodity; but, if the average 
loadings of the former were substantially higher, the Commission 
would not necessarily require a proportionately higher rate for the 
more valuable commodity.32 
2. Differential Between a Raw Material and Its Product 
One area of controversy over the effects of value-of-service pricing 
has involved shippers of a particular raw material and those handling 
the final product. In 1932, the Commission prescribed a maximum 
rate on rough stone and a minimum rate on dressed stone, finding 
that a lesser differential between the two would unduly prejudice 
shippers of rough stone.33 On the other hand, it refused to require 
a differential between wheat and flour,34 and eventually prescribed 
equal rates for the two commodities.35 In the Commission's view, 
flour-milling added relatively little value to the raw material. 
3. Differential Between a Commodity 
and Its Related Scrap or Waste 
In some of its early cases, the Commission held that the rates 
should not differentiate between new and used articles,36 and, for 
32. Official Classification Rating"S, 37 I.C.C. 166, 183 (1915); Straw Rates from St. 
Louis, Mo. to Anderson, Ind., 36 I.C.C. 30 (1915). This course was not followed when 
the proposed rates were below out-of-pocket costs or undermined an inherent cost ad-
vantage of a competing mode of transportation. The Commission's regulation of inter-
modal competition in recent years has perhaps overshadowed other important work of 
the Commission. See pt. VIII infra. 
33. O'Meara v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 183 I.C.C. 3 (1932). See also Builders' Assn. v. 
Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 190 I.C.C. 221 (1932). In Young v. Chicago I. & L. Ry., 89 I.C.C. 
428 (1924), the Commission refused to prescribe a differential where the rates were ap-
parently depressed on both commodities. Similarly, in Crown Willamette Paper Co. 
v. Director General, 78 I.C.C. 273 (1923), it refused to prescribe a differential where the 
manufactured item was subject to competition and the raw material was not. 
34. Grain & Grain Products, 164 I.C.C. 619, 652-53 (1930). 
35. Grain To, From & Within S. Territory, 259 I.C.C. 629, 783 (1945). See also George 
A. Hormel & Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 263 I.C.C. 9, 39-40 (1945); Eastern Livestock 
Cases of 1926, 144 I.C.C. 731, 740-41 (1928). 
36. Wiessbaum & Co. v. Director General, 53 I.C.C. 681 (1919); Cal Hirsch & Sons 
Iron & Rail Co. v. Washington, B. & A. Elec. R.R., 26 I.C.C. 480 (1913). 
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the most part, these precedents have been followed.37 However, when 
a commodity, such as old burlap bag-s, was so worn that it was suit-
able only for conversion into fiber, then a lower rate has been re-
quired.38 Furthermore, since the enactment of the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1968,39 new emphasis has been placed 
on the differentials properly to be accorded scrap and waste 
materials. 40 
4. Use to Which a Product Is Put Is Not Controlling 
The primary use to which a product is put often determines its 
character for transportation purposes no less than for nontransporta-
tion purposes. The carrier as rate maker may not be able to identify 
a product divorced from its use. In such a case, a product's primary 
use properly may provide the basis for a particular rate, rather than 
another rate, by comparison with the rates in effect on products 
similar to the primary use, rather than the rates in effect on products 
similar to a secondary use.41 
However, the Commission has often struck down differentials 
between essentially the same products when the only distinction 
drawn by the carrier was in the use to which the product was put 
at that time. The article's use at any given moment might not re. 
main the same, and might in any event have no relation to the 
transportation characteristics of a shipment of such articles.42 If, 
37. Condenser Serv, &: Engr. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 296 I.C.C. 495 (1955); 
Vacuum Cleaner Mfrs. Assn. v. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry. Co., 276 I.C.C. 783 (1950). 
38. Coastal Bag &: Bagging Corp. v. Texas &: N.O.R.R., 277 I.C.C. 789 (1950); Aaron 
Ferer &: Sons v. Belt Ry., 151 I.C.C. 197 (1929), 
39. P.L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1970)), 
40. See, e.g., Increased Freight Rates, 1970 &: 1971, 339 I.C.C. 125, 201-09 (1971), 
appeal docketed sub nom. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(S.C.R.A.P.) v. United States, No. 806-72, D.C. Cir. (environmental issues). 
41. A single or unique use may determine the character of an article. A rate may 
be premised on this use if the article is thereby clearly distinguishable from competing 
commodities. Ranger Joe, Inc. v. Biter's Transfer, Inc., 54 M.C.C. 587,590 (1952): Glenn 
L. Martin Co. v. W.T. Cowan, Inc., 44 M.C.C 726, 728 (1945). The predominant use of 
an article determines its character for transportation purposes. Classification Rating of 
De-icer Truck Spray, 326 I.C.C. 389, 396 (1966), afjd. sub nom, Seaboard Air Line R.R. 
v. United States, 387 F.2d 651 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
42. Davis v. West Jersey Express Co., 16 I.C.C. 214, 216 (1909). Lower rates on coal 
for steam railroad use but not for use of electric railroads or for shippers generally 
were disapproved under sections 2 and 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 2-3 (1970), in Restricted Rates, 20 I.C.C. 426 (1911), afjd. sub nom. ICC v. Baltimore 
&: O.R.R., 225 U.S. 326 (1912). See also Apache Powder Co. v. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry., 
299 I.C.C. 649 (1957) (rates on low-grade nitrates used for explosives and on nitrates 
used for fertilizer): Limestone Mixtures &: Grits Within Official Territory, 280 I.C.C. 
367, 373 (1951) (rates on ground limestone put to different uses): American Salpa Corp. 
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 179 I.C.C. 195 (1931) (rates on scrap leather used for fertilizer and 
other scrap leather). 
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on the other hand, the use to which the item is put drastically alters 
its value, a higher rate would be permitted on the product than on 
the ingredient, even though only the use has changed and not its 
nature or properties.43 
5. Long-Term Depressed Conditions in an Industry 
During the Depression the Commission gave considerable weight 
to the prevailing low prices and distressed conditions in individual 
industries.44 Nevertheless, rate increases were allowed in response 
to clearly proven revenue requirements.45 The Commission also 
held that depressed conditions over the short term did not justify 
rate reductions,46 and conversely that shipper prosperity was no basis 
for a rate increase.47 
6. Applying Value-of-Service Principles 
The principles developed in these decisions only presented a 
partial solution to the Commission's problem of controlling arbitrary 
pricing by rate-making carriers. The more difficult problems were 
met when the Commission translated these criteria into distinct mea-
sures of value of service, and ultimately info rates for the future or 
damages for the past. 
Since relatively few cases were presented for decision, the Com-
mission could uniformly begin with some elementary rules. For ex-
ample, if the considered commodity has a wide range in value, the 
average or prevailing value will be used to determine the rate.48 
43. See C.B. Fleet Co. v. Aberdeen & R.R.R., 287 I.C.C. 89 (1952) (phosphate and 
soda sold as a laxative considered a medicine, rather than a chemical); Laboratory 
Products Co. v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 168 I.C.C. 681 (1930) (condensed milk considered 
a prepared food); Mead Johnson & Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 168 I.C.C. 157 
(1930) (maltose given a higher rate when used as a prepared food). 
44. General Commodity Rate Increases, 1937, 223 I.C.C. 657, 679, 683-84, 740-46 
(1937) (coal); Emergency Freight Charges, 1935, 215 I.C.C. 439, 464-65 (1936); Class 
Rates Within Ga., 209 I.C.C. 586, 589 (1935); Thomas Keery Co., Inc. v. New York, 
0. & W. Ry., 206 I.C.C. 585, affd., 211 I.C.C. 451, 455 (1935) (wood alcohol); Industrial 
Sand Cases, 1930, 204 I.C.C. 159, 164-65 (1934). 
45. Fifteen Percent Case, 1937-38, 226 I.C.C. 41, 105-06 (1938). 
46. Livestock-Western Dist. Rates, 190 I.C.C. 611, 629, 633, 643 (1933). 
47. Increased Ry. Rates, Fares & Charges, 1942, 255 I.C.C. 357, 396-403 (1943) (con-
curring opinion); Rubber Assn. of America v. Akron & B.B.R.R., 174 I.C.C. 79, 84 
(1931). See also Empire Steel Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 281 I.C.C. 512 (1951) (long-
term increases in value of scrap prices). 
48. United States Potters' Assn. v. Akron, C. &: Y. Ry., 172 I.C.C. 618 (1931); Auto 
Specialties Mfg. Co. v. Chesapeake &: O. Ry., 279 I.C.C. 245 (1950). :tower rates were, 
however, then prescribed where the value of the considered commodity was well below 
the average. E.g., Basic Refractories, Inc. v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 296 I.C.C. 345 (1955); 
Hill &: Griffith Co. v. Baltimore &: O.R.R., 294 I.C.C. 619 (1955). 
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Value of service is typically measured by comparing the rates on the 
commodities under consideration with those charged for similar 
commodities moving benveen the same, or perhaps even different, 
points. Similarly, a customary relationship bet\veen the rates on the 
considered commodity and other rates is a particularly useful mea-
sure of the value of service.49 
While these general rules are useful in setting rates for newly 
shipped commodities, they leave unanswered a fundamental ques-
tion. Each one of these measures presupposes that the existing rates 
have been created on a reasonable estimate of value of service; which, 
in conjunction with the fact that existing rates are largely carrier-
made, presupposes a reasonable exercise of judgment by carrier man-
agement. 
The uniform freight classifications, 60 for example, filed by the 
railroads and by the motor carriers, reflect an elaborate consideration 
of value of service, but the basis for these classifications does not 
necessarily lie in precise mathematical principles. The motor carrier 
industry appears to consider wholesale values in establishing freight 
classifications; but the weight given to any one factor will vary with 
transportation conditions.61 The Commission has described the prob-
lem of fixing class rates62 ~ one requiring it 
to establish a sufficiently ·wide range of rates which may be assigned 
to the general run of commodities, i.e., those that are not affected by 
special and unusual transportation conditions, in some degree of 
harmony with the value of the service rendered,li3 
The railroads, too, have not converted value of service into 
acceptable arithmetic terms. At the tum of the century, the chair-
man of the railroads' Western Classification Committee, J.T. Ripley, 
assigned ratings based upon "units." These units were functions of 
the value (in dollars) per 100 pounds and the volume (in cubic feet) 
per 100 pounds of a commodity. The formula was expressed in the 
49. Livestock-Western Dist. Rates, 176 I.C.C. 1, 43-44, 68-69 (1931). 
50. For a description of uniform freight classification and freight tariffs, sec D. 
LOCKLIN, supra note 17, at 158-69. 
51. See J. COLQUnT, THE ART AND DEVELOPMENT OF FREIGHT CI.AssIFJCATION 77, 247, 
268 (1956). 
52. Most freight traffic moves under "point to point" commodity rates. A relatively 
small percentage (perhaps 10% to 15%) moves under class rates, which arc assigned to 
commodities of like description and which are applicable within wide regions of the 
country. Such rates are ordinarily the highest rates that may be considered reasonable 
for a commodity. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 323 I.C.C. 503, 506-07 
(1964); Page Belting Co. v. Boston&: M.R.R., 294 I.C.C. 307, 308-09 (1955). 
53. Southern Class Rate Investigation, 100 I.C.C. 513, 646 (1925). 
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following terms: "Unit= 100 V + 100," where V is the value per 
w 
pound of a commodity (in dollars) and W the weight per cubic foot.54' 
It was subsequently shown that the Ripley units were related to the 
ratings linearly, through the equation "Rating= 36.71 + 3.5104 
(Unit)."65 Thus the rating increased in proportion to the increase 
in units, and units increased directly with value and inversely with 
the weight. The Commission, in an early period, referred to the 
Ripley units, which were "intended to express the relation to one 
another of weight, space, and value," as constituting "a basis for 
comparison with other articles" and an aid in establishing a fair 
classification system among articles.56 But this method has long since 
been discarded. 51 
The motor freight industry proposed its own classification for-
mula for all carriers in Class Rate Investigation, 1939.58 This scheme 
involved a "Value-Density" table and certain "mean rating factors."59 
Ratings were assigned as follows: 60 
Commodity 
llasic raw materials & 
unprocessed farm products 
Processed farm products 
Industrial materials 
llasic necessaries 
Partial necessaries 
Industrial equipment 
Luxuries and accessories 
Rating Percentage 
85 
90 
95 
100 
105 
110 
115 
Despite this "Value-Density" scheme, the Commission found that 
the foregoing ratings "represent the judgment of proponents and 
are not derived from any test."61 The Commission adopted the rail 
carriers' position that no formula could be derived and that the 
classification committees of the railroads might act "on their opinion 
54. ll. Aitchison, Weight Density and Value as Factors in Freight Classification, 
ICC llureau of Transport Economics 8: Statistics, Statement No. 469, at 34 (March 1946). 
55. Id. 
56. Suspension of W. Classification No. 51, I.C.C. No. 9, 25 I.C.C. 442, 452 (1912). 
57. ll. Aitchison, supra note 54, at 33. 
58. 262 I.C.C. 447, 496-501 (1945). 
59. 262 I.C.C. at 499. 
60. 262 I.C.C. at 500. 
61. 262 I.C.C. at 500. The Commission rejected the formula for use by rail carriers, 
whose ratings were in issue, upon finding that it was "designed for package freight 
only, but does not distinguish between the containers used or the manner of packing, 
and makes no real provision for articles of great weight density or high value, nor, of 
course, for bulk freight." 262 I.C.C. at 501. 
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that the importance of value and density in the classification of 
articles is not and cannot be determined by any fixed rule."62 
In view of the difficulties encountered by the carriers in measur-
ing value of service, the Commission's refusal to establish or adopt 
a value-of-service formula is understandable. Moreover, shippers' 
complaint remedies remain intact as carrier rates remain carrier-
made, consistent with the over-all plan of Congress in enacting the 
Interstate Commerce Act. 
The value-of-service rates were still subject to limitations of 
public policy, and could be found detrimental to the public interest 
in individual cases. The Study Group Report urges that this position 
was not strong enough, and that the Commission somehow should 
have taken a more active role in removing value-of-service elements 
from the rate structure.63 Was such a role advisable? It was, if we 
assume with the Study Group Report that any tolerance of value of 
service in the carrier-made rates rendered the Commission an accom-
plice to uneconomic practices and excessive rates. What then have 
been the practical effects of value-of-service pricing? 
III. THE EFFECTS OF V ALUE·OF-SERVICE RA.TES 
The Study Group Report condemns value-of-service pricing with 
the observation that such a system of rates "involves the perpetua-
tion of fundamental misallocations of resources, which a competitive 
industry would not allow."64 Without competition, the Report sug-
gests, there is no incentive for railroads to eliminate unneeded capac-
ity. Thus value-of-service pricing, according to the Report, has the net 
effect of providing "more transportation, or more transportation 
cost, than is necessary."65 The cost of this "transportation ineffi-
ciency" is passed on to the shippers, particularly long-distance ship-
pers and the shipp.ers of high-valued goods.66 The Report notes: 
One stated impact of the present value-of-service system has been 
rising overcapacity, particularly for the railroads. Since overcapacity 
means inefficiency and higher cost, the effects of this factor are re-
flected in across the board price increases and inefficiencies.67 
The Report apparently suggests that the ICC should end its policies 
62. 262 I.C.C. at 487. 
63. See STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 147-54. 
64. Id. at 148. 
65. Id. at 149. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 150. 
June 1972] Transport Rate Regulation 1237" 
of value-of-service pricing and "enforcement of excessive profits 
for certain commodities."68 
True enough, the Commission policy has long called for a reduc-
tion in the intramodal competition that the authors of the Study 
Group Report find desirable. This course has been followed because 
the Commission's experience demonstrates that gross inefficiencies 
would othenvise result. In the eyes of the Commission, the intra-
modal competition proposed by the Study Group would mean dupli-
cation of facilities and inefficient use of existing facilities, and would 
in no way help to alleviate the plight of railroads in financial trou-
ble. 69 On the other hand, the policies behind the Interstate Com-
merce Act, which are complemented by value-of-service pricing, are 
intended to promote greater utilization of existing facilities by en-
couraging the unification of facilities.70 The Commission's success in 
fulfilling these goals may to some extent be measured by the reduc-
tion in the amount of track mileage owned and operated by the 
railroads over the past fifty years, which is illustrated in the table 
below: 71 
Mileage Operated 
Miles of First 
Year Road Owned Main Track All Tracks 
1910 240,293 240,831 351,767 
1915 253,789 257,569 391,141 
1920 252,845 259,941 406,579 
1925 249,398 258,631 417,954 
1930 249,052 260,440 429,883 
1935 241,822 252,930 419,228 
1940 233,670 245,740 405,975 
1945 226,696 239,438 398,054 
1950 223,779 236,857 396,380 
1955 220,670 233,955 390,965 
1960 217,552 230,169 381,745 
As the table suggests, value-of-service pricing encouraged the use 
of existing facilities only; and the Commission's adherence to this 
68. Id. at 153. 
69. See 85 ICC ANN. REP. 72 (1971). 
70. In the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933, ch. 91, 48 Stat. 211, 
Congress created a Coordinator of Transportation to promote rail unification, espe-
cially at terminals. In the Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, § 7, 54 Stat. 905, Con-
gress amended section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1970), to 
encourage voluntary rail unifications by permitting the Commission more easily to 
authorize them. 
71. 44 ICC .ANN. REP., Table I, at 131 (1930); 51 ICC ANN. REP., Table I, at 127 
(1937); 64 ICC ANN. REP., Table I, at 141 (1950); 75 ICC ANN. REP., Table I, at 195 
(1961). Mileage given is as of Dec. 31 of that year, and mileage operated includes track-
age rights. The net total mileage continued to grow until 1930 due to the use of track 
agreements; but even this figure has steadily declined since then. 
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criterion did not add to the overcapacity, although the continued 
adherence to value of service by the railroads may have accelerated 
the need to reduce capacity as the motor carriers were given an 
opportunity to compete for high-value commodities that were charged 
high rates by the railroads. In any event, capacity has declined and 
continues to decline without any sharp breaches in available service. 
The Study Group Report insists that value-of-service pricing 
can exist only in the presence of monopoly power. The Report finds 
"monopoly power" in high market share and inherent cost ad-
vantages. 72 If there were more competition between the railroads 
and the other modes, the Report continues, such monopoly power 
could not exist, for rates would necessarily be cost-oriented. The 
Report writers apparently believe the Commission "allows" only 
"contrived and false" intermodal competition that "results in a 
discriminatory rate system . . . which misallocates transportation 
resources on a massive scale."73 
The errors contained in the Study Group Report's analysis of 
the railroad's economic power are threefold. First, the Report 
does not attempt to show that over-all railroad profits are exces-
sive. Although revenue-to-cost ratios on some commodities are 
much higher than on others, the "monopoly power" of which the 
Report speaks is not shown to have resulted in a general level of 
rail rates that substantially exceeds average -unit costs. Furthermore, 
the Report gives no authority for its pronouncements concerning 
what is or is not "allowed" by the Commission. Rates are initially 
established by the regulated carriers through the filing and posting 
of tariffs. If there were instances in which intrarailroad rate competi-
tion was stifled by the Commission, they should not be difficult to 
document; but they in fact do not exist.74 
The most important of the Report's mistakes is its understate-
ment of the potential and actual effects of motor competition on rail-
road rates and earnings. A recurrent theme of many Commission 
72. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 157•81. 
73. Id. at 181. 
74. The rate agreements approved by the Commission under section 5a of the 
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1970), accord each carrier the right of inde-
pendent action, which includes even the right to revoke or modify outstanding au-
thorizations granted by carriers to tariff-publishing agents. See Rule 52 of Tariff Cir-
cular No. 20, 337 I.C.C. 274, 279-81 (1970). 
The STUDY GROUP REPORT apparently relies only on Adams, The Role of Competi-
tion in Regulated Industries, 70 .AM. ECON. AssN. PAPERS &: PROCEEDINGS 527, 533-84 
(1958) (the Report miscites this article as 48 AM. ECON. REv. 533, see STUDY GROUP 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 137 n.ll), a broadside attack on all regulation of interstate 
carriers and, in particular, the Commission's handling of one section 5a agreement, 
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decisions starting from the early 1940's is that motor transportation 
is or is becoming widespread and poses a serious threat to railroad 
earnings. This theme is repeated in major rate cases75 and rail-merger 
hearings.76 
The steady growth of the motor carriers' participation in inter-
city traffic demonstrates the intense competition encountered by 
the railroads. The Commission's annual reports to Congress show 
the following distribution of intercity ton-miles between railroads 
and motor carriers: 77 
Railroads Motor Vehicles 
Year (including express and mail) (in billions) 
(in billions) 
1955 631.4 226.2 
1956 655.9 253.8 
1957 626.2 244.9 
1958 558.7 255.5 
1959 582.5 288.5 
1960 579.1 297.7 
1961 567.0 313.l 
1962 600.0 331.3 
1963 629.3 331.8 
1964 666.2 349.8 
1965 708.7 388.4 
1966 750.8 380.9 
1967 731.2 388.5 
1968 756.8 396.3 
1969 774.0 404.0 
1970 768.0 412.0 
The railroads' share of the intercity market declined from forty-five 
per cent of the total intercity traffic in 1959 to forty per cent in 1969.78 
This result in itself would suggest that intramodal competition is 
not necessary. 
75. E.g., Midwest Emery Freight System, Inc. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 321 I.C.C. 637, 
658-59 (1964); Paint & Related Articles in Official Territory, 308 I.C.C. 439, 440-41 (1959); 
New Automobiles in Interstate Commerce, 259 I.C.C. 475, 488-92, modified 263 I.C.C. 771 
(1945). 
76. E.g., Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger-New York Cent. R.R., 327 I.C.C. 475, 514-20, 
modified 328 I.C.C. 304, affd. sub nom. Erie-Lackawanna R.R. v. United States, 259 F. 
Supp. 964 (1966), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 372 (1967); Norfolk & W. Ry.-Merger, 307 I.C.C. 401, 416, 440 (1959). 
77. 71 ICC .ANN. REP. 11 (1957); 72 ICC ANN. REP. 10 (1958); 73 ICC ANN. REP. 11 
(1959); 74 ICC .ANN. REP. 10 (1960); 75 ICC .ANN. REP. 15 (1961); 76 ICC ANN. REP. 12 
(1962); 77 ICC .ANN. REP. 74 (1963); 78 ICC .ANN. REP. 34 (1964); 79 ICC ANN. REP. 59 
(1965); 80 ICC ANN. REP. 53 (1966); 81 ICC .ANN. REP. 55 (1967); 82 ICC ANN. REP. 
86 (1968); 83 ICC .ANN. REP. 87 (1969); 84 ICC .ANN. REP. 77 (1970); 85 ICC ANN. REP. 
119 (1971). Data for 1970 are preliminary. 
78. 75 ICC .ANN. REP. 15 (1961); 85 ICC .ANN. REP. 119 (1971). Modes included in 
the total of domestic intercity traffic are railroads (including express and mail), motor 
vehicles, inland waterways (including Great Lakes), oil pipelines, and airways (including 
express, mail, and excess baggage). 
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However, there is yet another factor indicating the importance 
of motor carrier competition when considering railroad profits. Be-
sides the Commission's direct control over each general increase 
proposed by the railroads, it possesses the means to regulate railroad 
earnings indirectly through the regulation of motor carrier earn-
ings. Therefore, the rate increases allowed the railroads may re-
sult in substantially lesser percentage increases than projected, be-
cause of motor carrier competition. 
The Commission recognized in the 1960's that it was necessary 
to consider motor carrier earnings more closely than in prior years. 
For this reason, the Commission came to the realization that it had 
not developed techniques for deciding how much profit the various 
groups of motor carriers should earn, and that it needed to do so to 
implement over-all transportation policy.79 
Recently, the railroads, too, have begun to monitor motor carrier 
earnings more closely. They have responded to such competition 
with a new variety of volume rates that are designed to expand 
traffic and revenues. We next examine how the value-of-service 
standards, which are reflected in these volume rates, confronted the 
discrimination sections of the statute, and the work of the Commis-
sion in resolving the conflict. 
IV. THE TREND IN VOLUME RATE REDUCTIONS 
The Commission's contributions in the field of rate-making in 
the 1960's extended to many areas, not the least of which concerned 
the new varieties of volume rate reductions. Here, again, the ques-
tions before the Commission were resolved not strictly in terms of 
the cost of service, but instead on other and broader principles. 
In the earliest period of federal railroad regulation, the Com-
mission, seeking to protect small shippers, denied the existence of 
carload cost savings through its refusal to approve discounts for 
carload movements.80 Its attitude changed, however, as new tech-
niques of cost accounting were developed and better accounts were 
kept by the railroads. By 1939, the Commission had removed not 
only the regulatory restraints on the filing of reduced carload rates, 
but also those on the further-reduced multicar and unit-train rates.81 
79. See pts. VI & VIII infra. 
80. Providence Coal Co. v. Providence & W.R.R., 1 I.C.C. 363 (1887): 1915 Western 
Rate Advance Case-Part II, 37 I.C.C. 114, 155 (1915), See III-B I. SHARFMAN, supra 
note 13, at 404-06. 
81. See Molasses from Nel'I' Orleans, La. to Peoria & Pekin, Ill., 235 I.C.C. 485, 502 
(1939). 
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Nevertheless, only in the 1960's-when the railroads filed a number 
of new volume rate reductions-did these carriers become fully 
aware of the increased profits obtainable through the use of greatly 
reduced volume rates.82 The resulting increased number of volume 
rate applications that occurred during that period raised for the 
Commission several knotty questions concerning discrimination. 
In the first of the Eastern Seaboard Coal cases,83 the Commission 
was faced with price discrimination among coal shippers. The pro-
posed rate ·reduction of thirty-five cents per ton in this case was 
conditioned on the consignee's receiving at least 1.5 million tons of 
coal from one or more of the specified points of origin. The impetus 
for the reduced rate was the threatened construction by the consignee 
electric company of a generating plant at the mouth of the coal 
mine. Construction of the plant would have deprived the railroad 
of a substantial volume of coal traffic. In light of these facts, the 
Commission found that the reduced volume rate was not unjustly 
discriminatory. 
The second of these cases84 was similar to the first. There the 
railroads again faced a potential loss of coal traffic. Shippers were 
threatening to substitute less expensive imported residual fuel oil 
for coal. The railroads' response was to meet the competition with a 
specially tailored reduction of the coal rates. The reduction was con-
ditioned on the shipment of a stated annual volume so tliat the 
reduced rate would apply only to the coal that would othenvise be 
replaced by oil. The Commission considered the possibility that the 
proposed schedules contravened the proscription against unjust dis-
crimination among shippers of like goods found in section 285 of the 
Interstate Commerce Act, but decided that 
[t]here is no evidence that the proposed rates are designed to 
create favoritism among shippers of like traffic, or that they are in 
fact creating or are likely to create favoritism. On the contrary, the 
only purpose of these rates is to prevent substantial traffic losses to 
the respondent railroads. As such, the discrimination resulting from 
82. See generally P. MAcAvoY &: J. SLOSS, REGULATION OF TRANSPORT INNOVATION, 
THE ICC AND THE UNIT CoAL TRAINS TO THE EAsT CoAST (1967). Unfortunately, the 
authors relied upon the railroads' brief in Coal to New York Harbor, 311 I.C.C. 355 
(1960), for the proposition that the railroads believed that restraints continued after 
1939. Id. at 77, citing Brief for Respondent Railroads at 34. In context, that brief 
merely said that the railroads would have to show competition existed at the eastern 
seaboard to avoid the requirement of the statute (49 U.S.C. § 4 (1970)) that inland 
points receive comparable discounts. 
83. Coal from Ky., Va., &: W. Va. to Va., 308 I.C.C. 99 (1959). 
84. Coal to New York Harbor Area, 311 I.C.C. 355 (1960). 
85. 49 u.s.c. § 2 (1970). 
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the reduced rates may be considered as justified by the circumstances 
and conditions attending the particular transportation service.80 
The Commission also considered the possibility that the proposed 
schedule was unduly preferential, a result that would be in contra-
vention of section 387 of the Act. It concluded that the proposed 
rates did not violate this provision either, emphasizing that 
[t]here is no objection to these rates by any coal shipper or receiver, 
nor is there any indication that injury or disadvantage might be sus-
tained by any such shipper or receiver as a result of these rates. The 
utilities do not compete with any receivers of bituminous coal at the 
destinations specified in the tariffs. Without a showing of competi-
tion or disadvantage, there can be no finding of undue preference or 
prejudice.as 
Thus, after a consideration of the particular circumstances-but 
with no discussion of cost savings-the Commission concluded that 
the proposed schedule was lawful. ~ 
In the years that followed the Eastern Seaboard Coal cases, the 
Commission continued to approve volume rate tariffs without find-
ing violations of section 2 and 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act. 
For example, multiple-car rates on grain were permitted to become 
effective in 1963, although final approval was not given until 1965.80 
And annual-volume rates on coal between two points in Indiana 
were approved in 1964 despite objections raised by a supplier of 
natural gas.90 In 1965, certain carload rates on champagne, vermouth, 
and wine were allowed by the Commission so that railroads could 
effectively compete with unregulated water transportation. The rates 
in this latter case were also approved without reference to cost 
savings in a report of the entire Commission.91 
Several other annual-volume rates were permitted to take effect 
during this period without the institution of formal investigations. 
These included rates on coal,92 soybean meal or cake for export,03 
86. 311 I.C.C. at 369. 
87. 49 u.s.c. § 3 (1970). 
88. 311 I.C.C. at 367. 
89. Grain in Multiple-Car Shipments-River Crossings to the South, 325 I.C.C. 752 
(1965), following Temand in Arrow Transp. Co. v. Cincinnati, N.O. &: Tex. Pac,, Ry., 379 
U.S. 642 (1965). 
90. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. New York Cent. R.R., 323 I.C.C. 75 
(1964). 
91. Wine, Pac. Coast to the East, 329 I.C.C. 167 (1966), afjg. 326 I.C.C. 119 (1965). 
92. Suspension :Bd. Case No. 44247 (I.C.C., Nov. 16, 1966); Suspension :Bd. Case No. 
45347 (I.C.C., May 8, 1967). 
93. Investigation & Suspension Docket No. 8353 (I.C.C., May 5, 1967), 
June 1972] Transport Rate Regulation 1243 
corn and soybeans,94 and raw cane sugar.95 However, it is the Rent-
a-Train case96 that provides the best illustration of the trend of the 
Commission's policies regarding volume rate discounts. The novel 
tariff in this case involved a 700,000-dollars-per-year rate on ship-
ments of oats, wheat, or corn, when the transportation was performed 
in shipper-furnished cars. To be eligible for this rate, shippers were 
required to tender shipments for a minimum number of trips each 
year, and for each trip the shipper was limited to 8,600 tons per 
86-car train; if additional cars were needed, the tariff was correspond-
ingly higher. In the Commission's eyes, this rate structure was 
analogous to multicar and unit-train rates, and it therefore rendered 
a favorable opinion on this plan, too. 
Many of these and other similar rate cases involved exclusive 
dealing provisions, which at least one commentator would limit.97 
But as the Commission explained in Rent-a-Train, the exclusive 
dealing provisions would constitute destructive competitive practices 
only when the railroads were at the same time attempting to meet 
the competition of other modes of transportation subject to the 
Interstate Commerce Act. If the competition occurred benveen coal 
and residual oil, or involved other "market competition," an exclu-
sive dealing arrangement would not be unlawful per se.98 
Despite the Commission's favorable attitude toward exclusive 
dealing arrangements for quantity rate shipping, an annual-volume 
rate, predicated upon a similar arrangement, would not be permis-
sible in most cases. Such an arrangement could bind the shipper's 
traffic to one carrier, or a group of carriers, to the exclusion of other 
carriers, for an excessive period of time.99 The shipper, in the Com-
94. Suspension Bd. Case No. 43803 (I.C.C., Sept. 9, 1966, affd. Sept. 13, 1966). 
95. Suspension Bd. Case No. 41917 (I.C.C., Dec. 16, 1965, affd. Dec. 20, 1965). 
96. Grain by Rent-a-Train, IFA Territory to Gulf Ports, 335 I.C.C. 111 (1969), 
a[fd., 339 I.C.C. 579 (1971). 
97. Note, Exclusive Dealing Provisions Under the Interstate Commerce Act: A Re-
appraisal, 82 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1536 (1969). 
98. 339 I.C.C. at 590-91. 
99. It has been suggested that an exclusive dealing arrangement be allowed, (1) 
where the railroad would have to invest a considerable sum of money to inaugurate a 
new service, or (2) where the carrier competition was seasonal. Note, supra note 97, at 
1547. Both examples might violate the Interstate Commerce Act in the presence of 
cai;rier competition, but not market competition. 
Those who urge this view unduly minimize the "lock-in" effect of an exclusive deal• 
ing arrangement, arguing that the lock-in would last no more than one year, since 
"upon e.-xpiration of the tariff, the shipper's traffic would be open to bidding by all 
competing carriers." They also suggest that the shipper could withdraw from the agree-
ment at least during the early part of the tariff period. Id. at 1544. The latter sugges-
tion would not likely be feasible if a shipper had geared its operation for large-volume 
shipments by rail. The tariffs in question, of course, do not "expire" at the end of one 
year; and a "lock-in" effect of a full year could in fact do substantial harm to a com-
peting carrier. 
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mission's view, should not be placed in a position that would make 
the acceptance of superior or equal transportation services from 
another regulated carrier prohibitively expensive. If the minimum 
tonnage required by the exclusive dealing condition were set so high 
that it removed a substantial portion of the traffic from the com-
petitive arena, tying the traffic to one carrier, other carriers would 
be precluded merely by the form of the tariff from competing. Such 
a result would violate the National Transportation Policy.100 
On the other hand, annual-volume rates have been approved, or 
permitted to take effect without suspension101 of the effective date, 
whenever the reduced rates merely permitted a shipper to meet the 
competition of another shipper or group of shippers, or produced 
an indirect effect on shippers. In one case, for example, the reduc-
tions were filed on raw materials moving to a processing facility; the 
only carrier competition brought to the attention of the Commission 
here was that in the marketing of the finished product.102 In three 
other cases, the reduced annual-volume rates affected the market 
competition at the distribution points after the movements from the 
points of production occurred.103 None of these rates involved carrier 
competition; therefore, none were suspended. 
A basic question relating to volume rates that affect market com-
petition remains unexplored on any formal record before the Com-
mission. Should the Commission establish limits on the rate advan-
tages accorded large shippers or ports, and, if so, what should those 
limits be?104 On the one hand, there is Justice Holmes' admonition 
that the "law does not attempt to equalize fortune, opportunities, or 
abilities" ;105 on the other, there might be a point beyond which a 
large shipper or an individual port would be "unduly preferred" 
100. 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1970). See New York Cent. R.R. v. United States, 368 
U.S. 349 (1962), afjg. mem. 194 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afjg. Contract Rates on Rugs 
and Carpeting from Amsterdam, N.Y. to Chicago, 313 I.C.C 247 (1961). 
101. The Commission can suspend the operation of proposed rates for up to seven 
months. 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1970). For the history of the power, see Arrow Transp. Co. v. 
Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658, 662-66 (1962). For a recent critical analysis of the e.xercise of 
the power, see Spritzer, Uses of the Summary Power to Suspend Rates: An Examinatio11 
of Federal Regulatory Agency Practices, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 39 (1971). 
102. Suspension Bd. Case No. 41917 (I.C.C., Dec. 16, 1965, afjd,, I.C.C. Div. 2, Dec, 20, 
1965). 
103. Suspension Bd. Case No. 45287 (I.C.C., April 26, 1967, afjd., I.C.C. Div. 2, April 
27, 1967); Suspension Bd. Case No. 45060 (I.C.C., March 29, 1967, afjd., I.C.C. Div, 2, 
March 31, 1967); Suspension Bd. Case No. 41869 (I.C.C., Dec. 1, 1965). 
104. The Secretary of Agriculture briefly raised the issue in Soybean Cake or Meal 
for Export, Redfield, Iowa to Port Arthur, Tex., Investigation &: Suspension Docket 
No. 8353 (I.C.C.), but the order of suspension was vacated without investigation on 
May 5, 1967. 
105. ICC v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U.S. 42, 46 (1911). 
June 1972] Transport Rate Regulation 1245 
and a smaller competitor "unduly prejudiced" by rate advantages 
accorded the larger entity merely for reasons of size. The only avail-
able legal standard helpful in answering this question lies in a broad 
statement of the Supreme Court made many years ago: 
To bring a difference in rates within the prohibition of Sec. 3 [ of 
the Interstate Commerce Act], it must be shown that the discrimina-
tion practiced is unjust when measured by the transportation stan-
dard. In other words, the difference in rates cannot be held illegal, 
unless it is shown that it is not justified by the cost of the respective 
service, by their values, or by other transportation conditions.106 
The above issue has become more important with the appearance of 
the numerous volume discounts of the 1960's, and it is not likely to 
disappear without substantial litigation.107 
V. THE EXPANSION OF COMPETITION AMONG THE PORTS 
The complex rate-making tasks performed by the Commission 
in the 1960's were not confined to the increasing role of volume 
discounts. One of its major undertakings was the enforcement of 
fair competition among the nation's ports, a task that concerned 
perhaps more conflicting interests than any other the Commission 
faced. The crux of this problem lies in the fact that the provisions 
of the Interstate Commerce Act that protect shippers and localities 
from the discrimination are not cost-oriented. When, for example, 
Congress amended the statute in 1935 to protect ports, it did not 
thereby seek to further the most efficient development of economic 
resources, except insofar as it might be consistent with its purpose 
to "encourage and promote the freedom of movement ... through 
the ports of the country," so that commerce could "move freely 
through as many available ports as the governing circumstances will 
reasonably permit."108 For this reason, the Commission has given 
controlling weight to considerations other than distance, which pre-
sumably measures certain costs, in requiring the railroads to equalize 
their rates between competing ports.109 The Commission's position 
received new emphasis in several cases during the 1960's. 
106. United States v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 263 U.S. 515, 524 (1924). 
107. The problem is particularly acute in cases involving a reduced rate that is con-
ditioned upon a minimum past movement. Whenever annual-volume rates are condi-
tioned upon minimum volumes shipped in a prior period, the annual-volume reduction 
may be more a reward for past patronage than an incentive to ship larger volumes. It is 
also unavailable to shippers first entering the field, and therefore might stifle shipper 
competition altogether. 
108. H.R. REP. No. 1512, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935). 
109. In the late 1940's and the 1950's the common practice was to give diminishing 
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A. Texas Gulf Port Cases 
In a series of cases involving the Texas Gulf ports, the Commis-
sion at first did not have to look beyond the distance principle to 
promote port competition. Upon finding that the distance between 
Freeport and the territory in question was comparable to that be-
tween the "Houston group"110 and the same territory,111 the Com-
mission required equality of treatment for Freeport and the Houston 
group on export and other traffic to and from points exceeding 150 
miles from the Houston group.112 But distance alone would not 
fulfill the congressional mandate to promote traffic through all of the 
ports. Accordingly, the Commission also required that Corpus 
Christi, a port not as well situated as either Freeport or the Houston 
group, be equalized with the Houston group for grain traffic flowing 
from the same territory,113 and for cotton moving from an even wider 
territory of origin.114 In the latter case, the distances to Corpus 
Christi were from twenty per cent to si..xty per cent greater than to 
the Houston group under the mileage standard on which the Com-
mission most heavily relied.115 Despite this fact, a three-judge district 
court on appeal sustained the Commission's decision in the case 
involving cotton on the grounds that "there is more to natural 
advantage and location than geographic mileage differences, and 
shorter mileage to one port does not automatically give immunity 
from rate equalization."116 The district court gave its approval to 
the Commission's rejection of a "mechanical definition of a preju-
dice"117 and held that the Commission's equalization order was 
rationally based in light of the similarity of the terrain throughout 
weight to distance and increasing weight to competition only as the length of the haul 
increased. See Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 335 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1949). See 
also Baltimore 8: O.R.R. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 258, 275 (D. Md.), modified per 
curiam sub nom. ICC v. Baltimore 8: O.R.R., 355 U.S. 175 (1957). 
110. The Houston group includes the cities of Houston, Galveston, and Texas City. 
111. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist. v. Abilene 8: S. Ry., 319 I.C.C. 54, 67 
(1963), afjd. 322 I.C.C. 529 (1964), afjd. sub nom. Atchison, T. 8: S.F. Ry. v. United 
States, 231 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ill. 1964). 
112. 322 I.C.C. at 68. 
113. Export Grain from Tex. to Tex. Points, 319 I.C.C. 16 (1963). Nueces County 
Navigation Dist. No. 1 v. Atchison, T. 8: S.F. Ry., 315 I.C.C. 155 (1961). 
114. Nueces County Navigation Dist. No. I v. Atchison, T. 8: S.F. Ry., 325 I.C.C, 
400 (1965), afjd. sub nom. City of Galveston v. United States, 257 F. Supp, 243 (S.D, Tc.x, 
1966), afjd. mem., 386 U.S. 269 (1967). 
115. 325 I.C.C. at 408. The distance was much less under other mileage standards 
to which the Commission referred, 
116. City of Galveston v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 243, 248 (S.D, Tc.x. 1966), aff d, 
mem., 386 U.S. 269 (1967), 
117. 257 F. Supp. at 247. 
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southwestern Texas and the prior equalization of rates charged for 
other commodities flowing from these same origins to both Corpus 
Christi and the Houston group. 
B. South Atlantic Port Cases 
The problem of rate equalization also arose before the Com-
mission in cases concerning the country's southeastern ports. By 
1961, the Gulf ports were already on a parity with the South Atlantic 
ports for all export and import traffic to and from "Central Terri-
tory"-an area covering Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan's Lower 
Peninsula, and adjacent Mississippi and Great Lakes ports in certain 
bordering states. It was the Commission's opinion that similar parity 
should be granted to Tampa, Florida; consequently, it ordered parity 
for Tampa on traffic moving from those points of origin within the 
Territory, whose distances from Tampa fell within the range of 
distances from the same points to the Gulf and South Atlantic ports 
when the rates to those ports were equal.118 Furthermore, the Com-
mission ordered parity from those same points between Tampa and 
the South Atlantic ports whenever the rates to the South Atlantic 
ports exceeded the rates to the Gulf ports.119 The relief thus granted 
Tampa entrance into competition with the range of ports extend-
ing from Wilmington, North Carolina and Morehead City, North 
Carolina to the Houston group and Corpus Christi on the Gulf. 
In another Atlantic port proceeding, the question of prejudice 
bet\V'een ports was again raised. Goods moving to Morehead City-
as opposed to Wilmington-were charged higher freight rates when 
the point of origin was within the "Interior Southern Territory"-
a region including points west of Danville, Virginia, to the Missis-
sippi River.120 The railroads had equalized the rates to these ports 
for goods shipped from origins that were more distant. The Com-
mission concluded from this fact that there was no justification for 
the Interior Southern Territory price differential. It explained: 
[W]e are satisfied that cost alone provides an inadequate basis upon 
which to determine the issues here before us. Moreover, it is clear 
. . . that such a basis might defeat its own purpose by encouraging 
the carriers to reduce their import and export rates . . . to the pre-
118. Hillsborough County Port Auth. v. Ahnapee & W. Ry., 313 I.C.C. 691, 705-06 
(1961), affd. sub nom. Alabama, T. & N.R.R. v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. 
Ala. 1962). 
119. 313 I.C.C. at 706. 
120. City of Wilmington v. Alabama Great S.R.R., 316 I.C.C. 709 (1962). 
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scribed minimum level, thus resulting in needless dissipation of car-
rier revenues. 
The general policy of the Commission in cases of this kind has 
been to permit or require equalization where the geographically 
handicapped port appeared to be at a serious competitive disadvan-
tage by reason of the rate adjustment, provided that such equaliza-
tion was confined ·within reasonable limits determined by the needs 
of the ports concerned, the carriers serving them, and the shipping 
public. Generally, such equalization has not been approved in areas 
close to the respective ports.121 
For this reason, the Commission approved equalization of the export-
import rates from the Interior Southern Territory to the two ports, 
except when the class-rate122 distances between such points and 
Morehead City exceeded those to Wilmington by more than twenty-
five per cent. In these instances, the use of differentially higher rates 
to Morehead City was approved.123 
C. North Atlantic Port Cases 
The Commission's effort to give credence to distance, and hence 
to cost of service, in the competition between the North Atlantic 
ports met only with court reversal during the 1960's. 
From the period prior to federal regulation of the railroads, 
traffic moving through the southern-tier ports-Baltimore, Philadel-
phia, and Hampton Roads-had enjoyed export and import rates 
lower than those charged to the northern-tier ports, in New York and 
New England, from "Differential Territory"-an area west of 
the Buffalo-Pittsburgh line to the Mississippi River and north of 
the Ohio River. When the railroads serving the northern tier at-
tempted to place that group of ports on a parity with the southern 
tier for rates to and from Differential Territory, the Commis-
sion refused to lend its approval to the newly reduced rates.124 Its 
decision was reversed on appeal.125 The district court held that the 
proximity of the southern-tier ports, especially Baltimore, to 
121. 316 I.C.C. at 723, 725. 
122. See note 52 supra. 
123. 316 I.C.C. at 725-26. 
124. Equalization of Rates at North Atlantic Ports, 311 I.C.C, 689 (1969), affd,, 814 
I.C.C. 185 (1961). At the same time the railroads serving the northern tier reduced thek 
rates, those serving the southern tier reduced theirs to preserve the differential, and 
both sets of changes in the rates were suspended, investigated, and subsequently dis• 
approved by the Commission. 
125. Boston and M.R.R. v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 830 {D, Mass. 1962), affd. by 
an equally divided court sub nom. Baltimore 8: O.R.R. v. Boston 8: M.R.R., 37ll U.S. 
372 (1963). 
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Differential Territory could not justify the Commission's action. It 
reasoned that the Commission's decision, "if pressed to its logical 
conclusion, would result in traffic flowing only through the most 
distance favored port."126 
The differential rates on imported iron ore were also the subject 
of numerous Commission and court opinions in the 1950's and 1960's. 
During this period, the Commission found the reduced rates on iron 
ore from New York to Differential Territory unlawful, but ap• 
proved the reduced rates from Philadelphia.127 Both aspects of its 
holding were reversed in nvo separate appeals.128 On remand, the 
Commission approved the New York reduction, yet reaffirmed its 
approval of the Philadelphia reduction.129 In reversing its previous 
position regarding New York, the Commission noted that carrier 
costs to and from New York were higher because of "the longer rail 
hauls involved from the port of .New York," but held that "relative 
distances involved in railroad service to and from competing ports 
is only one factor to be considered in the equalization of rail rates to 
and from competing ports on export and import traffic .... "130 
These decisions of the 1960's effectively establish the principle 
that export and import rates strictly tailored to transportation costs 
are not permissible under existing law if they unduly restrict port 
competition. The factor of distance, and hence costs, is but one of 
several factors to be considered, as both the Commission and the 
courts indicated. Thus, the Commission was not alone in recognizing 
and enforcing these noncost considerations in the establishment of 
freight rates, an effort that must in the future expand further the 
competition among the nation's ports. 
VI. MAXIMUM RATE REGULATION OF THE MOTOR CARRIBRS 
By the mid-1940's, the decline of railroad intercity traffic and the 
growth of interstate motor truck traffic had become an annual event. 
126. 202 F. Supp. at 837. The court added that the sole function of the differential 
had been to offset the higher ocean rates to Philadelphia, a situation that no longer 
pertained. The Commission thereafter accepted the filing of reduced rates between 
New York and Differential Territory on export and import traffic, except for those 
on coal, coke, and iron ore. See Iron Ore from E. Ports to Cent. Freight Assn. Points, 
321 I.C.C. 473, 489 (1964). 
127. Iron Ore from E. Ports to Cent. Freight Assn. Points, 314 I.C.C. 149 (1961). 
128. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 13 (D. Md. 1962); New York 
Cent. R.R. v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
129. Iron Ore from E. Points to Cent. Freight Assn. Points, 321 I.C.C. 473' (1964). 
By this time the iron ore traffic had been diverted from the North Atlantic ports to the 
St. Lawrence Seaway and the Great Lakes ports. 321 I.C.C. at 475. 
130. 321 I.C.C. at 489. 
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For hauls up to 200 or 300 miles, the available evidence demonstrated 
that the motor carriers clearly held a cost advantage.181 The Com-
mission's response to this development was to promote an orderly 
change so that the motor carriers could benefit from their "inherent 
advantage" while railroads adjusted to the decreased demand for 
their services. 
The Commission therefore permitted general increases in motor 
carrier rates to assist the railroads to maintain their own increases 
without losing traffic. The Commission believed that in this manner 
both modes would fairly compete and yet maintain needed levels of 
service. The Commission in explaining its position noted: 
Whether the railroads ,vill be able to maintain the increases here 
sought ,vill depend largely upon whether their principal competitors, 
the motor carriers, make similar increases in their freight rates and 
charges. The motor carriers are not parties to this proceeding, but 
obviously their entire rate structure and freight revenues will be in-
directly affected by the decision in this case. . . . 
Railroad executives who testified that total freight revenues 
would be increased rather than reduced by the proposed increases 
based their opinion, in part, upon the fact that, in the past, motor-
carrier rates have been quickly increased after a general freight rate 
increase by the railroads. In most cases if the motor carriers do not 
increase their rates, the railroads ,vill not be able to maintain the 
increases. This fact is of particular significance when it is realized 
that the total revenues of the motor carriers subject to our jurisdic-
tion are now more than half as much as those of the railroads subject 
to our jurisdiction.1s2 
Or, as the Commission many years later said, the general increases 
allowed the motor carriers during the I940's and 1950's "in certain 
ways supported the increases required by the railroads to maintain 
their service."183 
In 1962, the railroads' total intercity ton-miles, but not their 
relative participation in total intercity traffic, began increasing over 
the previous year. This trend continued throughout the 1960's, as 
the total intercity ton-miles of all modes increased.184 The new eco-
131. See, e.g., New Automobiles in Interstate Commerce, 259 I.C.C. 475, 583 (1945), 
132. Increased Freight Rates, E., W. & S. Territories, 1956, 300 I.C.C. 633, 667-68 
(1957). See also Increases, Transcontinental-Intermountain Coast, 304 I.C.C. 15, 16-17 
(1958); Transcontinental & Western Increases, 1952, 61 M.C.C. 755, 756 (1953); Trans• 
continental & Rocky Mountain Increases, 54 M.C.C. 377, 378 (1952); Transcontinental 
Motor Rates-Increases, 49 M.C.C. 211, 213 (1949). 
133. Increased Class & Commodity Rates, Transcontinental, 329 I.C.C. 420, 422 
(1967). 
134. See table accompanying note 77 supra. 
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nomic activity in the nation during the early 196O's, which was 
responsible for this increase in rail traffic, also produced higher 
profits for the motor carrier industry.135 Together, these events made 
the Commission more conscious of the importance of accurately 
measuring, and controlling, motor carrier earnings. As a result, the 
Commission set new standards for testing whether the proposed rate 
increases would indeed be "just and.reasonable." In short, the "oper-
ating ratio"-formerly the Commission's fundamental tool in evalu-
ating motor carrier performance-was no longer deemed sufficient. 
The operating ratio lent itself nicely to the broad-brush regu-
latory policy followed by the Commission in the years preceding 
1960. This ratio of expenses to revenues had originated with the 
railroads as a test of their year-to-year efficiency and stability of 
income.130 A high operating ratio in one year might indicate in-
stability, for the small profit margin could easily evaporate into a 
loss.1a1 
However, the operating ratio took on a different meaning in the 
regulation of the level of motor carrier rates. Without relating the 
ratio to any return on investment, the Commission adopted a ninety-
three per cent operating ratio as the test of a £air and reasonable 
profit level for the regulated motor carriers.138 In many of this 
period's rate hearings, the Commission stated that mass comparisons 
of costs and rates of hundreds of carriers could thereby be made 
more easily.139 
Certain state commissions also began to rely on the operating 
ratio as a test of fair earnings for local carriers, such as bus com-
panies;140 but most of these commissions did not stray very far from 
the rate-of-return-on-investment standard, which they used to check 
the results reached under an operating ratio.141 Nonetheless, it was 
135. See 79 ICC ANN. REP. Table J5, at 162 (1965). 
186. E. SALIERS, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 838 (1923). 
137. Studies were also done to determine to what extent this ratio reflected varia-
tions in volume of traffic, and hence reflected elements of constant costs. R. WESr• 
MEYER, ECONOJIUCS OF TRANSPORTATION 75-77 (1952). 
138. See, e.g., Increased Common Carrier Truck Rates in the East, 42 M.C.C. 633, 
650 (1943). 
139. Central Territory General Increases, 49 M.C.C. 4, 12 (1948); New England, 
1946 Increased Rates, 47 M.C.C. 509, 518 (1947). In Middle West General Increases, 48 
M.C.C. 541, 550 (1948), the Commission added that the ratio is useful in deciding upon 
appropriate differentials as between truckload and less-than-truckload rates. 
140. E.g., Metropolitan Coach Lines, 10 P.U.R.3d 337, 844 (Cal. Pub. Util. Commn. 
1955); Savannah Transit Co., 11 P.U.R.3d 880 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Commn. 1955); Pittsburgh 
Rys., 21 P.U.R.3d 170 (Pa. Pub. Util. Commn. 1957). 
141. See, e.g., cases cited in note 140 supra; Long Beach Motor Bus Co., 12 P.U.R.3d 
198, 204 (Cal. Pub. Util. Commn. 1955); Duke Power Co., 12 P.U.R.3d 300 (N.C. Util. 
1252 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 70:1223 
the complete departure from rate-of-return concepts by one local 
commission that led to the famous opinion by the United States 
Court of Appeals £or the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en 
bane, on the subject of operating ratios. The decision not only af-
fected the local regulatory agencies, but influenced the Commission's 
regulatory policies as well. 
In D.C. Transit System, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area 
Transit Commission (Third Bebchick),142 the court reviewed the 
propriety of the operating ratio as a test of fair earnings, and con-
cluded that the use of this standard alone would not suffice. The 
court was aware of the £act that the Interstate Commerce Commission 
believed this standard "provide[ d] a £airer test of revenue needs in 
in an industry in which, characteristically, a carrier's capital invest-
ment is small in comparison to his total costs."143 It noted: 
The principal risk in such operations inheres in the cost of operation, 
not in the investment. Accordingly, the operating ratio method per-
mits a carrier to earn an amount representing annual operating costs, 
plus an additional amount from which to pay interest to the creditors 
and dividends to the owners.144 
However, the court also observed that it had not been shown, either 
before the Interstate Commerce Commission or before any other 
tribunal, how the fair amount allowable £or interest and dividends 
could be measured from a review of bare operating ratios. When 
annual operating costs greatly exceed investment, for example, a 
return of 6.5 per cent on revenues would allow the regulated com-
pany a considerably greater dollar profit than a 6.5 per cent return 
on investment. The court recognized that it was, perhaps, the "ap-
parent ex~essiveness of adequate returns expressed in traditional 
return-on-rate base terms" that led to the adoption of the operating 
ratio;145 but the court held the local commission must return to the 
fundamental rate-making standard established by the Supreme Court 
Commn. 1956); Salt Lake City Lines, 2 P.U.R.3d 405 (Utah Pub. Serv. Commn. 1953); 
Milwaukee Elec. Ry. 8: Transp. Co., 91 P.U.R. (n.s.) 82, 94 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Commn. 
1951). 
142. 350 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The case of 13ebchick. v. Public Util. Commn., 
287 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1961), involved questions of standing. The case of 13ebchick v. 
Public Util. Commn., 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963), in-
volved not only the merits of transit fares in the District of Columbia, but also the 
question of restitution of increases not shown to be reasonable, a matter discussed at 
text accompanying notes 213-14 infra. The fourth case of this group is entitled Williams v, 
Washington Metro. Area Transit Commn., 415 F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir, 1968). 
143. 350 F.2d at 759. 
144, 350 F.2d at 759-60. 
145. 350 F.2d at 760 n.9. 
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in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.: 146 that a just and reasonable rate 
may be fixed only with "particularized reference" to the needs of the 
regulated company in servicing its debt and equity and in meeting 
its legitimate expenses.147 
In other words, Third Bebchick concluded that alth_ough it 
might not be possible or desirable to determine these needs in terms 
of a percentage of investment, a detailed inquiry into the needs of 
the company for earnings above operating expenses must neverthe-
less be made. In the court's view, an operating ratio, such as 95.13 
per cent, suggests "only that the legitimate operating expenses found 
by the Commission ... account for all but 4.87 per cent of the total 
revenues expected to be realized from the approved fare structure."148 
The gross revenues allowed are to cover expenses and "something 
more"; that is, the "sum of money needed to attract the capital, both 
debt and equity, required to insure financial stability and the result-
ing capacity of the utility to render the service upon which the public 
depends."140 
The Interstate Commerce Commission had expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the operating ratio several years prior to 1965;150 but after 
Third Bebchick was decided, it began disapproving general rate 
increases on the basis of that decision.151 In addition, it moved 
146. 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
147. 350 F.2d at 778. 
148. 350 F.2d at 778-79. 
149. 350 F.2d at 779. The court added: 
To determine that sum entails inquiries and findings-judgmental as the latter 
may often be because ratemakers must be prophets of the future as well as his-
torians of the past-into such things as the capital programs in prospect, what such 
programs entail in terms of down-payments as well as financing, the cost of bor-
rowing money, working capital needs, the desirable ratio of debt to equity, the 
incentives required by a stockholder to keep his money in the business and the 
dividends and growth: rates requisite to supply these incentives, the opportuuities 
in these respects provided in comparable businesses, and the related matters which 
must be prayerfully explored by the conscientious regulator before he can begin to 
say why he fixed upon 4.87 rather than 6.5 or 3.2. 
350 F.2d at 779. 
150. General Increases-Transcontinental, 319 I.C.C. 792, 803 (1963): "In view of 
the recurring attacks on the use of operating ratios to justify revenue needs • • • the 
carriers are admonished that in the future, expense items of representative carriers 
should be shown in greater detail, and all pertinent information regarding carrier-
affiliate relationships should be disclosed."; General Increase-Middle Atl. & New Eng-
land Territories, 319 I.C.C. 168, 176 (1963): "The mere showing of present operating 
ratios of above 93 percent without a showing of the factors that make up such a ratio 
is not sufficient for our purposes.''; General Increases-E. Cent. Territory, 316 I.C.C. 
467, 481 (1962): "Although an operating ratio of 93 percent has been found reasonable 
in the past, we do not regard such an operating ratio as an immutable standard." 
151. Increased Class & Commodity Rates, Transcontinental, 329 I.C.C. 420, 426 
(1967), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 
263 F. Supp. 552 (D. Colo. 1963); General Increase, Between East & Territories West, 
329 I.C.C. 626, 643 (1965). 
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rapidly to require more detailed financial information from motor 
carriers. 
Previously, the Commission had required the submission of 
detailed cost and traffic studies solely on a case-by-case basis. But in 
1967, the Commission adopted a new policy governing the quantum 
of evidence it expected from motor carriers seeking general rate 
increases.152 Now the Commission required such studies to be sub-
mitted in a uniform manner, as described in the Commission's 
policy statement; and for the first time it explicitly required carriers 
to state in detail the "amount of money needed by the carriers over 
and above their operating expenses to attract capital."rna 
The carriers did not heed the requirements of the Commission's 
policy statement and the orders that incorporated its requirements. 
This inaction elicited, first, a strongly worded opinion of the entire 
Commission in February 1969, and, second, the initiation of a rule-
making proceeding to codify and expand the reporting requirement 
for motor carrier earnings. 
In the Middle Atlantic and New England proceeding,164 the 
motor carriers, as the Commission stated, "made no attempt to 
respond to the 1967 Statement of Policy or the usual order for proofs 
with respect to the amount of money, in addition to operating ex-
penses, needed to attract debt and equity capital .... "106 The Com-
mission had already disapproved of the increase on other grounds.100 
Thus there was no necessity to discuss further the carrier's failure 
to report fully; nevertheless, it proceeded to warn the motor carriers 
that it must be provided with such data before it would approve their 
general rate increases. 
The Commission conceded in Middle Atlantic that a ratio of 
operating expenses to operating revenues might indicate the ef-
ficiency of management in controlling expenses as well as the relative 
profitability of different categories of traffic. However, in terms that 
left no doubt about its agreement with Third Bebchick, the Commis-
sion proclaimed "[n]o particular operating ratio can be used as the 
starting point to prove the existence of or to measure revenue 
needs."157 The Commission emphasized that "[s]ome analysis of 
the capital costs of the carriers' business must be presented to establish 
152. 32 Fed. Reg. 7002 (196'7). 
153. 32 Fed. Reg. at 7003. 
154. General Increase, Middle Atl. 8: New England, 332 I.C.C, 820 (1969), 
155. 332 I.C.C. at 831. 
156. 332 I.C.C. at 836. 
157. 332 I.C.C. at 820. 
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a need for additional revenue, and to measure such need."158 Once 
that is done, the earnings element can be translated into an operating 
ratio or profit margin. The resulting revenue need can then be 
compared to the rate level; and profit margins on various shipments 
of less than 1,000 pounds, as distinguished, for example, from truck-
load shipments, can be assessed to develop the amount of the in-
crease and where it should be allocated. In the Commission's words, 
"[the] correct approach assures coverage of [the motor carriers'] 
capital costs to which they are entitled."159 
In 1970 the Commission responded to the motor carriers' failure 
to disclose needed information directly. It commenced a rule-mak-
ing proceeding160 that led to the adoption of the current rules for 
submission by motor carriers of data whenever general increases are 
filed. Among the new requirements was a prescribed data sheet that 
solicited information about the projected earnings on the traffic in 
issue.161 The carriers are now specifically required to submit "evi-
dence of the sum of money, in addition to operating expenses, includ-
ing that needed to attract debt and equity capital, which they ,require 
to insure financial stability and the capacity to render service."162 
In short, the past decade has marked a complete change in the 
Commission's regulation of motor carriers' earnings. But, while it 
is clear that the Commission will predicate its decisions upon this 
new access to earnings information, the standards the Commission 
will employ in sifting through this data and using it to determine a 
carrier's need for capital remain unresolved. 
Numerous increases were disapproved by the Commission in 
the 1960's on the ground that the carriers had not presented represen-
tative cost and traffic data.168 As a result, the Commission had few 
158. 332 I.C.C. at 837-38. 
159. 332 I.C.C. at 838. 
160. Proposed New Procedures in Motor Carrier Revenue Proceedings, 339 I.C.C. 324, 
340 I.C.C. 1 (1971). Petitions for reconsideration may yet be filed in this proceeding. 
161. 36 Fed. Reg. 18309 (1971) (codified at 49 C.F.R. §§ 1104.1 to 1104.8 (1972)). For 
a base calendar year or for an accounting year the system's total revenue needs are 
gained by adding operating expenses and 
1, Leasing costs 
2. Miscellaneous deductions less other income 
3. Income taxes on ordinary income 
4. Net income (returns on debt and equity capital) 
Only that portion of items 2, 3, and 4 related to transportation is included in the 
computation; the allocation between transportation and nontransportation business of 
the carriers is made on the basis of the percentage of net tangible property devoted to 
transportation activities. 
162. 49 C.F.R. § 1104.4 (1972). 
163. E.g., Increased LTL Class & Commodity Rates, Pac. Northwest, 329 I.C.C, 1 
(1966); Increased Rates Within Southwest & Between Colo. and Wyo. & Southwest, 326 
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occasions to reach questions relating to the level of motor carrier 
earnings. However, in the cases that have decided the issue, a trend 
can clearly be discerned. In one proceeding, the Commission ap-
proved a requested rate increase in part on the basis of an earned 
rate of return that was lower than the national average.164 In another, 
the Middlewest case,166 the Commission refused to approve a general 
increase that would have provided a return of more than twenty-five 
per cent on the motor carriers' rate base. The Commission found 
that these carriers had typically earned approximately fifteen per 
cent on equity and that no "convincing showing" was made "of a 
need for higher rates."166 
Although the evidence is admittedly sketchy, it seems evident 
from these cases that the Commission will proceed on a course lead-
ing to refined standards for motor carrier profitability. The precise 
form for the presentation of past and projected earnings by carriers 
seeking rate increases is now prescribed; therefore, in future cases 
the Commission and the parties will be able to make use of this data 
and, together with expert testimony, derive the proper levels of 
motor carrier earnings in accordance with the new standards for 
maximum motor carrier rates. 
The new standards for motor carrier profitability will have an 
effect as well on the regulation of railroad rates. The railroads will 
not be able to assume, as they did in the 1940's, that a motor carrier 
increase will assist, as a matter of course, their own efforts to distrib-
ute a general increase to individual commodities. The railroads will 
now have to work harder to explain rate increases on individual 
commodities. 
VII. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE R.EsTITUTION OF 
UNJUSTIFIED RATE INCREASES 
In the 1960's the Commission often permitted the proposed an-
nual rate increases of the motor carrier industry to take effect pend-
1.c.c. 216 (1966); LTL COR Rates-Between East 8: Territories West, 326 I.C.C, 1'14 
(1966); LTL Class Rates &: Minimum Charges Between Midwest &: Cent. Territories, 
325 I.C.C. 106 (1965). 
164. Increased LTL, AQ &: TL Rates, To, From&: Between Ne-111 Eng. Territory, 335 
I.C.C. 185, 190, 200 (1969). 
165. Increased Rates &: Charges, From, To &: Between Middlewest Territory, 38!, 
1.C.C. 142 (1969), affd. sub nom. Admiral-Merchants Motor Freight, Inc, v. United 
States, 321 F. Supp. 353 (D. Colo.), affd. mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971). 
This case resulted in a refund of the increase to shippers, because the Commission 
required that the carriers agree to refund the increase, if it were found unjustified, as 
a condition to granting the carriers an extension of time to prepare their evidence, 
335 I.C.C. at 151. 
166. 335 I.C.C. at 150. 
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ing an investigation of their lawfulness. After performing these 
investigations, which sometimes took up to two years to complete, the 
Commission found many of these increases unjustified and, as a con-
sequence, ordered that rates be reduced. The Study Group Report 
found in this procedure a "simple but ludicrous"167 pattern of per-
mitting motor carriers to retain rate increases that were ultimately 
found to be completely unjustified. For this and other reasons,168 
the Report was highly critical of the Commission's regulation of 
motor rates. 
To be sure, the Interstate Commerce Act gives the Commission 
the choice of suspending or not suspending the effectiveness of pro-
posed increases pending their investigation.169 But if the Commission 
had suspended the effectiveness of each rate increase and each of 
those increases in fact had been justified, then the motor carriers 
would have lost forever the needed amounts that they were unable to 
collect during the suspension period. The shippers and consumers, 
on the other hand, would have been no worse off if they could have 
obtained refunds, with interest, of the unjustified increases. 
The problem, therefore, appears to lie in the fact that the Com-
mission does not, for the most part, order the motor carrier industry 
to refund rate increases that it finds are unjustified.170 Part !111 of the 
Interstate Commerce Act confers authority on the Commission to 
order railroads "to refund, with interest, to the persons in whose 
behalf such amounts were paid, such portion of such increased rates 
or charges as by its decision shall be found not justified";172 but Part 
Il173 of the Act, which is applicable to motor carriers, contains no 
comparable provision. Thus, if the Commission decides that a gen-
eral increase for a group174 of motor carriers is not justified, it will 
hold that the rates have not been shown to be just and reasonable, 
and, accordingly, that the carriers have not borne their statutory 
167. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 183. 
168. For example, the Report was highly critical of ICC regulation of trucking and 
intermodal competition. Id. at 170. 
169. 49 U.S.C. §§ 15(7), 316(g), 907(g), 1006(e) (1970). For a recent study of the sus-
pension practices of the Commission and other federal agencies, see Spritzer, supra note 
101. 
170. The exceptional Middlewest refund order is discussed in note 165 supra. 
171. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-5, 5b-27 (1970). 
172. 49 u.s.c. § 15(7) (1970). 
173. 49 u.s.c. §§ 301-27 (1970). 
174. The general increases of the motor carrier industry were filed during the 1960's 
with the Commission principally by ten rate bureaus. The major rate bureaus each 
have 200 or more member carriers in the parent trade association. See generally New 
Procedures in Motor Carrier Revenue Proceedings, 339 I.C.C. 324, 326•47 (1971). 
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burden of proof.175 Its order, however, will not require a refund of 
the excessive charges; instead, the Commission's decision will be ac-
companied, at most, by an order requiring the carriers to cancel the 
offending increase. And if other increases have intervened, even a 
cancellation is out of the question, for the rates in issue will have 
been superseded.176 
Apparently the Study Group Report inferred from the Interstate 
Commerce Act's dichotomy between railroads and motor carriers, 
and from the Commission's refusal to order refunds, that "under 
the statute there is no recovery for shippers who pay the increased 
rates if the Commission cancels the increase (for motor carriers),"177 
and therefore concluded, "unless the I.C.C. specifically so provides, 
the shippers who have been paying the higher rates ... will simply 
have to swallow their past loss ... .''178 Certain developments in the 
law of restitution in the 1960's suggest that this conclusion is in error; 
the shippers may have a cause of action in common-law restitution. 
The theory that can support a cause of action by shippers against 
a motor carrier is that under prevailing principles of equity, the car-
riers will be unjustly enriched if they are permitted to retain moneys 
to which they have not shown entitlement. This rationale seems 
particularly forceful since the Interstate Commerce Act imposes an 
affirmative duty on these carriers to prove this entitlement. In addi-
tion, since the rule of restitution is one of general application and 
has been held to apply to charges collected under agency orders, or, 
as here, under tariffs filed with the Commission,170 there is further 
justification in arguing for a cause of action based upon restitution. 
But despite these arguments, the validity of restitution as a means 
of preventing motor carriers from being unjustly enriched has been 
175. Section 216(g) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 316(g) (1970), pro• 
vides that "the burden of proof shall be upon the carrier to show that the proposed 
changed rate, fare, charge, classification, rule, regulation, or practice is just and rea-
sonable." 
176. The tariff publishing requirement relates to "rates" and "charges" and not to 
increments thereof. 49 U.S.C. § 317 (1970). Similarly, the carriers' burden of proof 
relates to the "proposed changed rate" and not merely to the incremental increase. 40 
U.S.C. § 316(g) (1970). When a second rate, therefore, becomes effective, it supersedes 
the first rate. However, since rates are constantly changed, it may be difficult to deter-
mine the precise date on which a general increase of all rates of a group of carriers 
was superseded. On the other hand, it has been assumed, quite properly, that a new 
general increase will surely have superseded a prior general increase. The shippers' 
maximum recovery, therefore, spans the period between the two general increases. The 
burden should be on the carriers to prove a lesser recovery is in order. 
177. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 183. 
178. Id. at 184. The Report does not give any source of authority for the Commis-
sion to "specifically so provide." 
179. See generally Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301 (1935); Baltimore 
&: O.R.R. v. United States, 279 U.S. 781, 786 (1928); Arkadelphia Milling Co, v. St, 
Louis S. Ry., 249 U.S. 134, 145 (1919). 
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cast into doubt by three important cases, each involving a suit for 
reparations,180 and one case now pending on appeal directly involv-
ing restitution. 
In T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States,181 the Supreme Court held that 
a common-law right to reparation against motor carriers to recover 
allegedly unreasonable past charges did not survive passage of the 
Interstate Commerce Act. The rationale used by the Court to reach 
this decision was that "because under the statutory scheme only the 
I.C.C. could decide in the first instance whether any filed rate was 
'unreasonable' either as to the past or future, any common law right 
was necessarily extinguished as 'absolutely inconsistent' with recog-
nition of the Commission's primary jurisdiction."182 The Court 
adopted this rationale from its 1907 decision in Cotton Oil,183 a case 
holding that the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act extin-
guished the common-law right to reparations against railroads.184 
From these two decisions, it may be argued that restitution, a 
common-law remedy which would produce an outcome similar to 
that in a reparations suit, has also failed to survive the Act's passage. 
This argument, however, fails to consider the limits placed by 
the Court on Cotton Oil and T.I.M.E. Unlike the right to repara-
tion, the right to restitution has been held, after Cotton Oil was 
decided, to coexist with those rights established by the Interstate 
Commerce Act.185 The Court made no suggestion to the contrary in 
T.I.M.E.; and in its subsequent Hewitt-Robins186 decision-a case 
involving damages for ~isrouting-the Court expressly limited the 
180. Section 9 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 9 (1970), allows any 
person claiming to have been damaged by a railroad's violations of the Act either to 
make a complaint to the Commission or to bring suit in a district court. Section 16, 49 
U.S.C. § 16 (1970), provides for enforcement of an ICC award of damages. The Supreme 
Court held at a very early stage that the Commission had primary jurisdiction over 
questions of the reasonableness of rates. Thus a shipper complaining of unreasonable-
ness must litigate that issue before the ICC. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil 
Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). The other parts of the Act contain similar provisions on 
claims for reparations. E.g., 49 U.S.C. § 304a (1970) (motor carriers). 
181. 359 U.S. 464 (1959). 
182. 359 U.S. at 473. 
183. 359 U.S. at 473-74, citing Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 
426 (1907). 
184. The shipper in Cotton Oil sought to assert the common-law right to reparation 
in a state court on account of allegedly excessive and unreasonable railroad rates. The 
Court held that the judicial exercise of such a power was "wholly inconsistent" with 
the Commission's administrative power "of seeing to it that the statutory requirement 
as to uniformity and equality of rates is observed," and with the Commission's own 
authority to award reparation. 204 U.S. at 441. 
185. See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 279 U.S. 781, 786 (1929). In such cases, 
the "cause of action for restitution is a type of the broader cause of action for money 
had and received, a remedy which is equitable in origin and function." Atlantic Coast 
Line R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 309 (1935). 
186. Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962). 
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T.I.M.E. holding. It emphatically noted in Hewitt-Robins that 
T.I.M.E. did not bar all common-law claims.187 
The limits on T.l.M.E. are perhaps more comprehensible when 
the procedural differences between restitution and reparation are 
analyzed. In a reparations case, the shipper must prove the unreason-
ableness of past rates, a task that may result in a potential attack on 
the current rate structure.188 Restitution, on the other hand, is more 
similar to the cause of action for misrouting, allowed in Hewitt-
Robins, than to a reparations claim; for it involves no attack on exist-
ing, presumably lawful, rates. The Interstate Commerce Act requires 
the carriers to prove the reasonableness of newly filed rates; and if 
they have failed in that proof, the cause of action for restitution only 
then comes into play. 
In this respect, the Court's rationale for rejecting the continued 
existence of reparations-that reparations suits would limit the Com-
mission's primary jurisdiction-would not seem to apply to restitu-
tion. Since section 216(j)189 of the Act preserves any such remedy 
"not inconsistent" with the Act, and the primary test of whether a 
cause of action survived the Act's passage "depends on the effect of 
the exercise of the remedy upon the statutory scheme,"100 restitution 
suits should be allowed. Restitution would complement the Com-
mission's regulatory scheme, not interfere with it. 
'While T.I.M.E. can thereby be distinguished from the typical 
restitution case, a potentially more serious objection to restitution 
can be traced to another aspect of the Commission's reparation 
practice, as the Feinstein case191 illustrates. In 1956, the Commis-
sion held that certain railroads had not shown their separately 
published loading and unloading charges, which were applicable 
in the New York City area, to be just.and reasonable.182 As a result, 
a shipper promptly sought both reparation under section 9103 of the 
Interstate Commerce Act and relief under indebitatus assumpsit on 
187. 371 U.S. at 86-87. 
For a more detailed discussion of T JM.E., see the court of appeals opinion in 
Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. United States, 433 F.2d 212, 232-36 (8th Cir. 1970), 
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 (1971). 
188. As a three-judge district court stated in National Motor Freight Assn. v. United 
States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 92 & n.1. (D.D.C. 1967), the Supreme Court in T JM.E. dealt 
with "past rates" or "reparations proceedings involving rates once effective under the 
regulatory laws administered by the Commission." 
189. 49 u.s.c. § 316G) (1970). 
190. Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 89 (1962), 
191. Feinstein v. New York Cent. R.R., 159 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
192. Unloading Charges on Fruits & Vegetables at N.Y. & Phila., 298 I.C.C. 63 
(1956). 
193. 49 u.s.c. § 9 (1970). 
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the theory of unjust enrichment in an action brought before the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
Judge Learned Hand analogized the Commission's finding, that 
the railroads had not shown the unloading charges to be just and 
reasonable, to a decree for an injunction, which "speaks from the 
date of its entry."194 He added that in an injunction suit, "before 
there can be an accounting for past profits or damages the court must 
find that the defendant had been guilty in the past of the same 
,vrong."19a The court was not satisfied that it wa~ hearing a suit for 
damages that was "cognizable in all its aspects by the District 
Court."196 Thus, Judge Hand denied the relief sought, but stayed 
dismissal of the section 9 claim pending application to the Commis-
sion for a finding of whether the rates charged and paid prior to the 
date of the Commission's findings were just and reasonable.197 The 
court dismissed the claim for indebitatus assumpsit, holding that the 
Commission must "pass upon the invalidity of the charges before the 
claim becomes absolute and is actionable at law at all."198 The 
shipper took no appeal, but proceeded to file a complaint with the 
Commission under section 13(1 )199 of the Interstate Commerce Act 
and to assume the burden of showing that the pre-1956 rates were 
unjust and unreasonable.200 The court's failure to grant restitution 
seemingly restricts the availability of that form of relief. 
Yet when closely examined, the Feinstein court's opinion is 
clearly inconsistent with sections 15(7) and 216(g)201 of the Interstate 
Commerce Act. A Commission finding under these sections, that 
rates have not been shown to be just and reasonable, speaks not from 
the date of entry, but from the date of the order instituting the in-
vestigation. This is most clearly shown in section 15(7), which ex-
pressly provides for a refund from the beginning of the proceeding. 
The final order under these sections, therefore, is not analogous to 
a decree for an in junction, but more to a grant or denial of relief 
requested by the carrier from its burden of proof. The final order 
either approves the rates and sets aside the order of investigation, or 
194. 159 F. Supp. at 463. 
195. 159 F. Supp. at 463. 
196. 159 F. Supp. at 463. 
197. 159 F. Supp. at 467. 
198. 159 F. Supp. at 467. The court also noted it had no diversity jurisdiction over 
this claim, but because of this disposition did not discuss pendent jurisdiction. 159 F. 
Supp. at 467. 
199. 49 u.s.c. § 13(1). 
200. William N. Feinstein &: Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 313 I.C.C. 783 (1961), 
affd. sub nom. Feinstein v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 613 (S.DN.Y. 1962), affd., 317 
F .2d 509 (2d Cir. 1963). 
201. 49 u.s.c. §§ 15(7), 316(g) (1970). 
1262 Michigan Law Review [Vol. '70:1223 
disapproves the rates and confirms the doubts expressed in the order 
of investigation. 
There is a further fundamental error in Feinstein under sections 
15(7) and 216(g). Both of these provisions treat the carrier's burden 
of proof as a matter of substantive law. The Commission's finding in 
1956, that the carriers had not shown the rates and charges to be just 
and reasonable, should have been sufficient to render them unlawful 
from the date of their effectiveness; for under the Act the carriers' 
burden of proof was a substantive adjunct to the validity of those 
rates and charges.202 
To be sure, there are several cases in which the Commission has 
found the same rates unlawful for the future but not for the past. 
Yet each of these cases involved no determination relating to the 
Commission's authority to have found those rates unlawful in the 
past. 
The decision most often miscited as standing for some limitation 
on the Commission's authority is the Baer Brothers case.203 The por-
tion of the opinion usually cited states: 
That the two subjects of Reparation and Rates may be dealt with 
in one order is undoubtedly true. . . . But awarding reparation for 
the past and fixing rates for the future involve the determination of 
matters essentially different. One is in its nature private and the 
other public. One is made by the Commission in its quasi-judicial 
capacity to measure past injuries sustained by a private shipper; the 
other, in its quasi-legislative capacity, to prevent future injury to the 
public.204 
The sentence that follows the above quotation, however, is too often 
overlooked. "But testimony showing the unreasonableness of a past 
rate may also furnish information on which to fix a reasonable future 
rate and both subjects can be, and often are, disposed of by the same 
order."205 In Baer Brothers, the Supreme Court only held that the 
Commission's jurisdiction to award reparation is not limited to cases 
202. In a different proceeding before a three-judge district court sitting in the 
Southern District of New York, the court per Judge Friendly held that it could not 
enjoin a rate that had become effective upon expiration of the suspension period, even 
though the carriers had not sustained their burden under section 216(g) of showing the 
tariff to be just and reasonable. He looked upon the shippers' request for an injunction 
as a request for the court to reinstate an expired suspension order, National Small 
Shipments Traffic Con£., Inc. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 500 (1970). The court 
apparently believed the Commission's investigation was incomplete, its hearings were 
"not properly concluded," and the Commission should "resume" its investigation, 821 
F. Supp. at 515-16. The court's final order and judgment of January 27, 1971, did in fact 
direct the Commission "to resume its investigation with all practicable speed." 
203. Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Denver&: R.G.R.R., 233 U.S. 479 (1914). 
204. 233 U.S. at 486. 
205. 233 U.S. at 486. 
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in which it also prescribes a future rate. The opm10n in Baer 
Brothers suggested two reasons for distinguishing past rates from 
future rates, but neither precludes a restitutory remedy. First, the 
Commission may fix a future rate on application of nonshippers that 
have no interest in obtaining reparation.206 Additionally, the Court 
noted that the Commission should not deprive a shipper of an award 
of reparation because of its own omission or inability to decide the 
future rates; a shipper might be able "to prove unreasonableness as 
to the past without being able to furnish evidence as to what would 
be reasonable for the future."207 
Many of the cases in which the Commission itself has distin-
guished between past and future periods by prescribing a rate or 
practice for the future, but refusing to award reparation, may be 
explained in terms of burden of proof. In effect, the Commission has 
held in those cases that if the burden was on the carrier, it must show 
the proposed rate to be lawful in all respects, and if unlawful in one 
respect it will be disapproved; and if the burden was on the shipper 
to show past unreasonableness, the Commission may rely on a ground 
for sustaining the past rate that is different from the ground it relied 
on to find the rate unlawful for the future.208 
The remaining refusals of the Commission to apply a finding 
regarding a future period to a past period relate generally to the in-
applicability of the future policy to the past period. When the order 
relating to the future resulted in a leveling of rate disparities, which 
increased some rates and reduced others, the Commission's refusal 
to award reparation (to those whose rates were decreased for the 
future) was sustained on appeal.209 And when the Commission re-
quired a general revision of the class rates, it refused reparation for 
a period of five years while the railroads revised their rates. Only 
after this period did it begin to order reparation in appropriate 
cases.210 
206. 233 U.S. at 487-88. 
207. 233 U.S. at 488-89. 
208. See, e.g., Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry., 287 I.C.C. 673, 
679-80, 684, 685 (1953); Tri-State Packers' Assn. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 209 I.C.C. 192, 
201 (1935). Similarly, when the Commission heard Feinstein, it refused to hold a 
separate charge by the railroads for unloading excessive because the shippers had 
assumed the burden of proof and new evidence was introduced concerning the reason-
ableness of the rates. William N. Feinstein &: Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 313 I.C.C. 783 
(1961), afjd. sub nom. Feinstein v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), 
afjd., 317 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1963). 
209. ICC v. United States ex rel. Capital Grain&: Feed Co., 35 F.2d 1012, 1013 (D.C. 
Cir. 1929) (beyond court's authority to grant mandamus ordering ICC to award repara-
tion). 
210. The problem is discussed and the cases are collected in William Volker&: Co. v. 
Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry., 318 I.C.C. 249 (1962). 
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From these examples, it would appear that the court in Feinstein 
incorrectly interpreted the Commission's failure to delineate the 
effect of its decision on the validity of past rates. Thus, when viewed 
in this light, Feinstein, like T.I.M.E., creates no inference that a 
right of restitution for unreasonable charges paid pursuant to a rate 
increase subsequently cancelled by the Commission does not exist. 
Recently, however, in United States v. Associated Transport, 
Inc., 211 now pending on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, the district court denied the existence 
of a restitution remedy when the Commission had found that certain 
rates were not shown to be just and reasonable. The court acted on 
grounds similar to Feinstein without citing that opinion. It added 
to the Feinstein rationale its view that T.I.M.E. precludes all relief 
for the past except as expressly given shippers under section 204a,212 
certainly giving that decision the broadest possible reading. 
On the other hand, no cases have held that there is a right of 
restitution on general principles of equity. To find such a remedy, 
we must take note of the shippers' need for some method of recoup-
ing what they have paid in an unjustified rate increase, and the case 
law that has developed in the area. 
In procedural settings not dissimilar to those present in ICC cases, 
there have been instances in which restitution has been granted. For 
example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
has recognized that local utilities that were unable to justify rate 
increases might be required to return moneys collected from rate 
payers.213 In each case, the court reversed decisions of the regulatory 
agencies, which had upheld the increases, and ordered the companies 
either to make restitution or to segregate amounts collected pending 
further hearings. The court found that no interference with any 
211. 1972 FED. CARR. REP. (Carr. Cas.) ,r 82,316 (D.D.C. May 12, 1972), notice of ap-
peal filed, D.C. Cir., July 12, 1972. 
212. 49 U.S.C. § 304a (1970). 
213. In Capital Transit Co. v. Public Util. Commn., 213 F.2d 176, 194-96 (D.C. Cir.) 
(order amending judgment), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816 (1954), the court reversed rui 
order that had permitted an electric power company to increase its rates, and directed 
the district court to order the company to segregate all amounts collected from the 
plaintiff customer by reason of the rate increase pending further hearings. In the 
Second Bebchick case (Bebchick v. Public Util. Commn., 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963)), the court en bane again reversed an order permitting an 
increase in transit fares of a local bus company and required that "the amount realized 
by Transit [the bus company] from the increase must be utilized for the benefit of 
the class who paid it, that is, those who use Transit." 318 F.2d at 203 (supplemental 
opinion). It required restitution of the amounts collected by the company through the 
creation of a special fund on the books of the company for the "purpose of benefiting 
Transit users in any rate proceedings pending or hereafter instituted," 318 F.2d at 
204. See also Williams v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Commn., 415 F.2d 900 
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (a further application of the principle of restitution). The district 
court in Associated Transport did not mention these cases. 
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statutory rate scheme would result if the utilities made refunds.214 
Refunds of increases that are found unjustified by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission would seem even less to involve the question 
of potential interference of the courts with a statutory rate scheme. 
The Commission will already have found that the carriers have not 
justified their rate increases before the court acts. 
Other courts have granted relief to shippers to avoid unjust en-
richment in cases in which an intervening court order prevented 
rates from being reduced in compliance with an Interstate Commerce 
Commission order.215 In one of these cases, the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit stressed that a rate not shown to be just and 
reasonable is unlawful, since the burden of proof requirement of the 
statute is substantive in nature;216 this rationale could support resti-
tution in the complete absence of an interfering court order. 
The availability of restitution after a Commission finding that a 
general increase by motor carriers was unjustified has been before 
three federal district courts. Only the court in American Transport 
faced the issue directly, and its denial of recovery is b-eing appealed. 
In two other cases, the courts granted relief to the shippers, albeit on 
narrower grounds.217 Nevertheless, the rudiments of a cause of action 
214. Bebchick v. Public Util. Commn., 318 F.2d at 204 (supplemental opinion). See 
Capital Transit Co. v. Public Util. Commn., 213 F.2d at 194-96 (order amending 
judgment). 
215. Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. United States, 433 F.2d 212 (8th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 (1971); Accelerated Transport-Pony Express, Inc. v. 
United States, unreported decision discussed in Middlewest, 433 F.2d at 228-29 (ordering 
restitution of amounts collected in excess of ICC rate order during existence of 
temporary restraining order, after dismissal of the carrier's complaint in 227 F. Supp. 
815 (D. Vt.), afjd. mem., 379 U.S. 4 (1964)). 
216. Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. United States, 433 F.2d at 220-21. The 
motor carriers relied on T .I.M.E. in their unsuccessful effort to bar any claim for resti-
tution. 433 F.2d at 232-40. The court did not decide whether the increased rates were 
unlawful from the date of their effectiveness. It expressly limited its holding to the 
period following the cancellation order entered by the Commission since no broader 
relief was requested by the parties. The only relief sought in the case was for a refund 
of the amounts charged during the very brief period (Sept. 13-29, 1965) of the district 
court's temporary restraining order. See 433 F.2d at 222. The Associated Transport court 
apparently did not notice the limited relief requested in Middlewest, and read that 
case as somehow recognizing "that the basic rate regulatory authority of the ICC is 
prospective and not retrospective." 1972 FED. CARR. REP. (Carr. Cas.) ,i 82,316, at 
55,477. 
217. Admiral-Merchants Motor Freight, Inc. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 353 (D. 
Colo. 1970), afjd., 404 U.S. 802 (1971); Aluminum Co. of America v. Admiral-Merchants 
Motor Freight, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Ill. 1971). Both of these cases arose out of 
a refund order of the Commission that was entered as a condition to the grant of a 
postponement of time for the carriers to prepare their evidence in Increased Rates & 
Charges, From, To & Between Middlewest Territory, 335 I.C.C. 142 (1969). However, as 
the Commission and the Solicitor General stated before the Supreme Court in Admiral-
Merchants Motor Freight, Inc. v. United States, "Had there been no refund order, the 
Commission's finding that the carriers had not met their burden of proof would have 
supported a shipper's cause of action for restitution." Government's Motion To Dismiss 
or Affirm, at 7 n.6. 
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for restitution are available in the decisions involving Commission 
orders and in the precedents of the District of Columbia Circuit and 
the Eighth Circuit. The signs thus point to the existence of the 
restitution remedy. 
VIII. PRESERVATION OF INHERENT SERVICE ADVANTAGES 
OF COMPETING MODES OF TRANSPORTATION 
The omission within the provisions of the Interstate Commerce 
Act of any statement concerning refunds of unjustified rate increases 
by motor carriers is but one illustration of the problems encountered 
by the Commission. The National Transportation Policy218 creates 
an equally perplexing challenge for the Commission in determining 
the regulatory standard to be followed. 
The Policy requires the Commission to "preserve the inherent 
advantages" of all modes of transportation subject to the Interstate 
Commerce Act, but fails to give clues to the meaning of this phrase. 
In fact, the other provisions of the Act only further complicate the 
situation. The Janus-like section 15a(3)219 prohibits the Commission 
from holding up rates to protect the traffic of any mode of transpor-
tation, yet also requires that "due consideration" be given "to the 
objectives of the national transportation policy" under which it may 
be necessary to hold up rates. 
During the 1960's the Commission received the aid of judicial 
interpretation in its quest to define "inherent advantage." In Ingot 
Molds,220 the Supreme Court sustained the Commission's disapproval 
of certain railroad rate reductions, which the ICC had rejected to 
protect the inherent cost advantages of certain bargeline carriers. 
Obviously, more is yet to be said by the Commission concerning the 
appropriate measure of the cost advantages of the various modes.221 
Relatively unexplored in the past decade has been the noncost com-
parisons among the modes. A few cases suggest the direction that 
transportation law may take in this area, and what the continuing 
role of the Commission ·will be. 
A. Pre-1958 Cases 
When the Director General was in charge of railroad operations 
during the First World War, he began the Mississippi-Warrior River 
218. 49 U.S.C. preceding § I (1970). 
219. 49 U.S.C. § 15a(3) (1970). 
220. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 5'11 (1971). 
221. The matter is now pending in Cost Standards in Intermodal Rate Proceedings, 
No. 34013 (Sub-No. I) (I.C.C., initiated Feb. 5, 1969). See also Rose, Regulation of 
Intermodal Rate Competition in Transportation, 69 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1011 (1971). 
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Barge Service and established many port-to-port rates at levels that 
were eighty per cent of the all-rail rates between the ports.222 The 
establishment of such differentials received congressional support in 
1928 in the enactment of the Denison Act,223 which the Transporta-
tion Act of 1940 codified in its essential respects in section 307(d)224 
of the Interstate Commerce Act. 
In Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. United States,225 this policy 
of intermodal rate differentials received judicial approval from the 
Supreme Court as well. The more important aspect of the case, 
however, can be found in the Court's approval of the criteria used 
by the Commission in sustaining the differential. The Commission 
had held that the joint rail-barge and rail-barge-rail rates in issue 
should be lower than the corresponding all-rail rates although differ-
ences in costs did not justify the differentials.226 The Court agreed 
that the ICC was not required to base differentials solely on the rela-
tive costs of service of the competing modes. It stated: 
Admittedly, barge service is worth less than rail service. It is slower, 
.requires more handling and entails more risk. A shipper will pay 
only what the service is worth to him. . • • The Commission is not 
bound to require a rate as high for the inferior as for the superior 
service.227 
The Court also noted that the inherent advantage of rail carriers 
shown here is superiority of service, and fixing a lower price for 
the lesser service did not destroy the superior service.228 
B. Post-1958 Cases 
In Paint i:t Related Articles in Official Territory,229 the Commis-
sion gave further recognition to the concept of service advantages. 
It remarked that competition between the modes of transpor-
tation includes competition in both rates and service and that the 
record before it indicated certain unenumerated service advantages 
222. See generally Harbeson, Transport Coordination and the Rail Barge Question, 
19 ICC PRAc. J. 765 (1952). 
223. Ch. 891, 45 Stat. 978. 
224. Ch. 722, tit. II, § 201, 54 Stat. 937 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 907(d) (1970)). The 
second sentence of this section provides: "In the case of a through route, where one 
of the carriers is a common carrier by water, the Commission shall prescribe such 
reasonable differentials as it may find to be justified between all-rail rates and the 
joint rates in connection with such common carrier by water." 
225. 340 U.S. 216 (1951). 
226. Rail 8: Barge Joint Rates, 270 I.C.C. 591 (1948). The differential was to be 
absorbed by the bargeline in its division of the joint rail-barge rate. 
227. 340 U.S. at 223. 
228. 340 U.S. at 227. 
229. 308 I.C.C. 439 (1959). 
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in the protesting motor carriers that might enable them to compete 
against the railroads' rate reductions without any reduction in their 
own rates.230 In the reopened Gasoline and Fuel Oil proceeding,231 
the Commission put this observation into practice by approving a 
one-cent differential between rail and motor rates to points seventy-
five miles or more from given rail origins. The differential was to be 
effected by increasing motor rates. In Tobacco from North Carolina 
to. Central Territory,232 the Commission similarly found that the 
motor carriers provide "faster and more flexible service," something 
which is "of some importance" in the marketing of tobacco prod-
ucts.233 It noted that as a result of superior motor service, motor 
movements may exceed rail movements despite a rail pricing advan-
tage of seven cents. The Commission, however; reached the conclu-
sion that both the rail and motor rate reductions should be disap-
proved to avert a "destructive rate war."234 
In two of the several Newsprint cases235 decided in the early 
1960's, the Commission approved successive reductions in the rail 
rates that at first narrowed, then eliminated, the ten per cent differen-
tial between the rail and barge rates. The Commission considered 
the shipper's investment in barge-related facilities to be sufficient to 
offset any service disadvantage over the barge route, and thus found 
no justification for tp.e differential.236 In another Newsprint case,231 
the Commission-without discussion of inherent advantages-pre-
scribed a differential of ten per cent between rail and barge rates to 
permit the barge lines to compete for traffic between Tennessee and 
Texas. But when the Commission, again without a discussion of in-
herent advantages, set a six per cent differential in piggyback rates 
over sea-land rates, its decision was reversed in the New Haven case.238 
In the New Haven litigation, the district court criticized both 
the Commission's disregard of inherent advantages and the Com-
230. 308 I.C.C. at 450. 
231. Gasoline &: Fuel Oil from Friendship, N.C. to Va. &: W. Va., 305 I.C.C. 6'13 
(1959). For other cases in these years, see Harbeson, The Regulation of Interagency 
Rate Competition Under the Transportation Act of 1958, 30 ICC PRAc, J. 287 (1962), 
232. 309 I.C.C, 347 (1960), 
233. 309 I.C.C. at 360. 
234. 309 I.C.C. at 361. 
235. Newsprint Paper from Tenn. &: Ala. to Baton Rouge, La,, 315 I.C.C. 117 
(1961), afjd. sub nom. Igert v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 42 (N.D. Ala. 1962); Newsprint 
Paper from Calhoun, Tenn. to Baton Rouge, La., 310 I.C.C, 171 (1960). 
236. 315 I.C.C. at 122-23; 310 I.C.C. at 179-80. 
237. Newsprint Paper from Tenn.&: Ala. to Houston, Tex., 313 I.C.C. 669 (1961), 
238. ICC v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 372 U.S. 744 (1963), vacating and remanding 
on other grounds 199 F. Supp. 635 (D. Conn. 1961), reversing Commodities-Pan• 
Atlantic S.S. Corp., 313 I.C.C. 23 (1960). 
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mission's apparent reliance on value-of-service pricing.239 The Su-
preme Court, on the other hand, limited its discussion solely to the 
Commission's disregard of inherent advantages. The Commission's 
broad reliance on the effects of the rates on the national defense and 
the country's commerce bore the brunt of the Court's criticism. The 
Court, quoting from a congressional committee report, noted that 
each mode should be permitted to assert its " 'inherent advantages, 
whether they be of service or cost.' "240 The Court stated that the 
railroads are permitted "to respond to competition by asserting what-
ever inherent advantages of cost and service they possessed.''241 The 
Court added: "If a carrier is prohibited from establishing a reduced 
rate that is not detrimental to its own revenue requirements merely 
because the rate will divert traffic from others, then the carrier is 
thwarted from asserting its mm inherent advantages of cost and 
service.''242 The Court's opinion carried the implication that a car-
rier should be permitted to reduce its rates to assert an inherent ser-
vice advantage. 
For the water carriers, the New Haven decision suggested that 
inherent service advantages of all-rail service must be described in 
explicit terms, not inferentially, if rate reductions for the railroads 
were to be denied. In the Aluminum case,243 a water carrier thus 
listed the all-rail advantages with which it had to compete in attempt-
ing to justify the rate differential it then enjoyed.244 The disabilities 
inherent in water transportation, which necessitated a rate differen-
tial benveen the all-rail and rail-water-rail carriers competing for 
aluminum traffic, were noted by the district court to include 
perils of the sea, infrequency of sailings, longer time in transit, lack 
of diversion and stop-off privileges in transit, bunching of cars at the 
interchanges, restrictions on size of cars handled, labor difficulties 
and strikes affecting coastwise shipping, and an embargo requiring 
shippers to obtain a permit before cars are supplied for movement in 
[water carrier] service.24o 
The district court found these factors to he convincing evidence of 
disabilities that would require the water carrier to maintain rates 
lower than those for all-rail service. 
239. 199 F. Supp. at 641, 642-43. 
240. 372 U.S. at 756, quoting S. REP. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958). 
241. 372 U.S. at 757. 
242. 372 U.S. at 759. 
243. Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1964). 
244. 233 F. Supp. at 208. The railroads had attempted to narrow the differential by 
reducing the all-rail through rate while continuing to maintain higher local rates on 
routes to and from the ports involved in rail-water-rail transportation. 
245. 233 F. Supp. at 208. 
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That New Haven's statement concerning a service advantage was 
not to be taken literally can be inferred from the Court's decision in 
Ingot Molds.246 There the railroads sought unsuccessfully to re-
duce their rates on iron ingots moving from Pittsburgh to Steelton, 
Kentucky to the level of rates charged by a competing barge-truck 
operation. The case turned on the Commission's adherence to a fully 
distributed, rather than out-of-pocket, cost comparison between the 
modes in determining which had the inherent cost advantage; but in 
sustaining the Commission, the Supreme Court specifically reversed 
the district court's reliance on the railroads' efforts to match the 
barge-truck rate. The Court suggested that the lower court had 
overlooked "the uncontroverted evidence that given equal rates all 
traffic would move by train," and added, "[g]iven a service advantage, 
it seems somewhat unrealistic to suggest that rate parity does not 
result in undercutting the competitor that does not possess the ser-
vice advantage."247 
In this regard, it is also interesting to note the stand taken by 
the Department of Justice, which in this case served as the Commis-
sion's antagonist. The Department argued that New Haven stood for 
the proposition that a carrier may reduce its own rates to any level 
that was compensatory in terms of its own revenue requirements 
unless "competing modes show that their inherent cost and service 
advantages will be unduly impaired or destroyed."248 The remark 
was not relevant to the facts before the Court, for the carriers reduc-
ing their rates possessed the service advantage, but not the cost ad-
vantage. But the Department did seem to recognize, unlike the New 
Haven opinion, that the possession of a service advantage does not 
measure ability to reduce rates, but rather to hold them up.240 
Although the railroads have been reluctant to admit, especially in 
cases concerning motor transportation competition, that a service 
advantage requires higher rates, there is at least one area of inter-
modal competition-that involving common carrier pipelines-in 
which they readily take this position. 
As early as 1922, the service advantages possessed by the pipelines 
became apparent to the Commission. At that time the Commission 
held that a pipeline carrier might require of shippers a minimum 
246. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968), 
247. 392 U.S. at 593. 
248. Brief for the United States at 7, American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville 
&: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 571 (1968). The Department parted with the Commission over 
whether out-of-pocket costs or full costs should determine which mode had an 
inherent cost advantage over the other. 
249. Conceivably, if the Commission had decided the New Haven case in tenns of 
inherent service advantages, the Supreme Court might have written an entirely different 
opinion and perhaps have sustained the Commission. 
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tender of 10,000 barrels at any one time, but that a minimum-tender 
requirement exceeding 10,000 barrels, except in special circum-
stances, would be unreasonable.250 The pipelines in these early pro-
ceedings asked for minimums of up to 100,000 barrels, arguing that 
the efficient operation of their lines, particularly in view of the heavy 
initial capital costs, required a promise of minimum tenders from 
their shippers. 
In more recent years, many pipelines have alleviated their pub-
lished minimums by allowing shippers to aggregate their tenders, 
either from a number of shippers or from a number of plants of one 
shipper. When one pipeline sought to reduce the effect of the mini-
mum even further by allowing one week to complete the minimum 
shipment, the railroads protested, arguing: 
The inherent advantage of pipeline operation is the transportation 
of liquids in large volume. This advantage is lost when shipments are 
received for transportation in small quantities. . . . Dissipation by 
Mid-America [a carrier by pipeline] of its inherent advantage in the 
handling of volume quantities unfairly exposes the railroads to loss 
of competitive traffic which they are best equipped to handle.251 
However, the Commission approved the pipeline's proposed change 
so that shippers, "especially the smaller ones," would benefit, and 
thereby dismissed the railroads' effort to thwart a tariff rule "pecu-
liarly adapted" to the pipeline's operating methods merely on 
grounds of "competitive disadvantage."252 
C. The Continuing Role of the Commission 
The Ingot Molds opinion corrected the faulty language of New 
Haven and returned the law of inherent service advantages to the 
stream of precedents that has developed since the early years of regu-
lation. The congressional choice to "preserve" service advantages be-
tween competing modes of transportation reflects in part a decision 
that competition between the modes should not rest solely on their 
relative costs of operation. 
Broadly speaking, the preservation of a service advantage today 
means that the carrier possessing the advantage should not be per-
mitted to reduce its rates below the level necessary to attract the 
250. Brundred Bros. v. Prairie Pipe Line Co., 68 I.C.C. 458 (1922) (decided by a 
division of three members of the Commission). The 10,000 barrel rule was later adopted 
by the entire Commission in Reduced Pipe Line Rates & Gathering Charges, 243 I.C.C. 
115, 136 (1940), affd., 272 I.C.C. 375, 382-83 (1948). 
251. Brief for Southwestern &: Western Trunk Line Rail Carriers at 43, Pipeline 
Demurrage & Minimum Shipment Rules on Propane, 315 I.C.C. 443 (1962). 
252. Pipeline Demurrage & Minimum Shipment Rules on Propane, 315 I.C.C. 443, 
448 (1962). 
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traffic. Unlike a cost advantage, a service advantage is preserved by 
keeping up the rates of the carrier possessing the advantage. Such a 
carrier would only dissipate the advantage if it charged rates that 
were equal to or less than those of the carrier that lacked the advan-
tage. It might be argued that the preservation of service advantages 
by keeping rates up also, unfortunateiy, preserves the service dis-
advantages of the disadvantaged carrier. The proponents of such an 
argument assume that the disadvantaged carrier should be permitted 
to go out of business. The more accurate characterization of the 
result reached by the statute is that the preservation of service 
advantages preserves the disadvantaged carrier along with its service 
disadvantages, a result that Congress intends under the National 
Transportation Policy. 
This congressional mandate has not led to the protection of 
carriers disadvantaged by poor management or inferior equip-
ment.253 The essential ingredients of the disadvantage have generally 
been factors and circumstances beyond the control of the disadvan-
taged carrier. The disadvantaged carrier must also have qualified as 
a member of a class entitled to the protection of the National Trans-
portation Policy.254 Keeping these factors in mind, the Commission 
continues its important function in appropriate cases of prescribing 
differentials to preserve inherent service advantages between com-
peting modes of transportation. 
IX. THE EXPANSION OF INTERMODAL JOINT RATES 
From the earliest years of the Interstate Commerce Act, the 
Commission accepted for filing in the public tariffs joint rates in 
which railroads in the United States and those in the adjacent foreign 
countries of Canada and Mexico participated. For example, as early 
as 1888, the Commision recognized that tariffs might be filed by 
railroads "jointly with one or more other carriers" on foreign-bound 
shipments.255 Its jurisdiction under the Interstate Commerce Act 
over such rates was later sustained in the courts.2G6 
For three quarters of a century, however, the Commission would 
not accept joint tariffs filed by railroads and ocean carriers; from the 
253. See Excursion Fares Betlveen Chicago, Ill. &: Minneapolis, St. Paul &: Rochester, 
Minn., 178 I.C.C. 742, 745 (1931). 
254. See American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 392 U.S. 5'11, 593 
(1968). 
255. In re Publication of Export Tariffs, 1 I.C.C. 658 (1888), 
256. See Canada Packers, Ltd. v. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry., 385 U.S. 182 (1966); H. K, 
Porter Co. v. Central Vermont Ry., 366 U.S. 272 (1961). Section l(l)(a) of the Act, 49 
U.S.C. § l(l}(a) (1970), gives the Commission jurisdiction over rail transportation "from 
or to any place in the United States to or from a foreign country, but only insofar as 
such transportation ••• takes place within the United States." 
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outset, it required that whenever a "gross sum" was agreed upon be-
tween railroads and ocean carriers for transportation of a shipment 
to a foreign country, "in every case" the railroad tariff filed with the 
Commission must show that portion of the charge applicable to the 
land transportation.257 Similarly, the Commission would not accept 
joint tariffs filed by railroads and motor carriers exempt from federal 
economic regulation. The Commission changed these practices in 
the 1960' s and began to accept both types of rates for filing. In so 
doing, it encouraged new forms of intermodal cooperation. 
A. The 1920 Amendment of Section l(l)(a) 
As originally enacted in 1887, the Interstate Commerce Act con-
ferred jurisdiction over transportation "from any place in the United 
States to an adjacent foreign country," when the traffic originated 
in the United States.258 Senator Cullom explained that to regulate 
interstate commerce "fairly and effectively it has been deemed neces-
sary to extend its application also to certain classes of foreign com-
merce which are intimately intermingled with interstate commerce, 
such as shipments bet:1v-een the United States and adjacent countries 
by railroad .... "259 
The subject of transportation was again before the Congress in 
1920. The Transportation Act of 1920 amended the Act to read: 
"from or to any place in the United States to or from a foreign coun-
try, but only in so far as such transportation ... takes place within 
the United States."260 
There was no legislative history to explain the removal of the 
word "adjacent." The Commission had only requested that the Con-
gress amend the statute so that it would include transportation both 
"to and from" an adjacent country.261 As a result, the Commission 
continued to read the statute as if "adjacent" were still present. The 
Commission apparently did not question whether the congressional 
reasons for originally limiting its jurisdiction over foreign com-
merce remained pertinent. 
The Commission's position suited both the railroads and the ocean 
carriers, neither of which seemed at all interested in establishing 
joint rates. Under the Commission's interpretation, the railroads 
257. I I.C.C. at 659. 
258. Ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379. See Pacific Mail S.S. Co. v. Western Pac. R.R., 251 
F. 218 (9th Cir, 1918); Lykes S.S. Co. v. Commercial Union, 13 I.C.C. 310 (1908); Ullman 
v. Adams Express Co., 14 I.C.C. 340 (1908). 
259, 17 CoNG. REc. 3472 (1886). 
260. Ch. 91, § 400, 41 Stat. 474 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1(1) (1970)). 
261. Hearings on H.R. 4378 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. I, at 10 (1919). 
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could still remain parties to voluntary arrangements that provided 
for continuous carriage of goods between an interior point within 
the United States and a nonadjacent foreign country; and the ocean 
carriers, freed from regulation, could change their rates at will.202 
The limitation the Commission placed upon its jurisdiction ex-
tended beyond rail-ocean joint rates. Using its rail-ocean policy as 
a model for determining the extent of its authority, the Commission 
explained in 1935 that "upon this line of reasoning it has been our 
ruling that joint rates cannot be made benveen carriers subject to 
the act and those not subject to the act."263 With such a narrow in-
terpretation of its authority, the Commission effectively foreclosed 
the possibility of joint rates benveen railroads and the numerous 
exempt motor carriers. 
B. The Re-examination of the 1920 Amendment 
The re-examination of the Commission's position, however, was 
triggered more by the potential growth in rail-ocean container move-
ments and the wholly new interest of the Department of Transporta-
tion in what it called "trade simplification"264 than by the limitation 
on joint rates benveen railroads and exempt motor carriers. Since 
there had been no relevant legislative history surrounding the 1920 
amendment to section 1(1), with these new developments staff of the 
Commission began to question Congress' purpose in removing the 
word "adjacent." One clue to the meaning of this change seemed now 
to lie in the proper interpretation of a forty-year old decision of the 
Supreme Court, which had been virtually forgotten. 
In Missouri Pacific R.R. v. United States,265 the Supreme Court 
held that the Commission possessed jurisdiction to prescribe the form 
of a railroad's bill of lading issued in connection with a shipment 
that would later be transported by a foreign-flag ocean carrier. It 
262. See Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 13 I.C.C, 266, 
279-80 (1908). 
263. Drayage 8: Unloading at Jefferson City, Mo., 206 I.C.C. 436, 440-41, citing 
Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 13 I.C.C. 266 (1908). The 
Commission stated that in such a joint arrangement it could not "control" the rates 
and practices of both parties. It added, a few years later, "that the absence of power 
to regulate all carriers parties to joint rates would in effect, render void our power 
to regulate such joint rates." Interchange of Traffic at Point of Origin, 46 M.C.C. 623, 
626 (1946). 
264. In 1968, bills entitled "The Trade Simplification Act of 1968" were introduced 
providing for the filing of joint rates by surface, water, and air carriers. S. 3235, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); H.R. 16023, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). A representative of the 
Administration said that the Commission had refused to accept joint rates filed by 
railroads in which ocean carriers had joined. See Hearings on S. 3235 Before the Senate 
Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 90-78, at 18 (1968). 
265. 273 U.S. 341 (1927). 
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read the Commission's power to prescribe bills of lading266 to be "a 
general rule" that must be enforced against all carriers subject to the 
Interstate Commerce Act, even if a portion of the through movement 
in which the railroad voluntarily participated was not subject to the 
Act.267 Missouri Pacific thus suggested that the Act also could be 
extended to cover voluntary joint rates of railroads and ocean car-
riers. 
In addition to the innuendoes of Missouri Pacific, the Com-
mission found a repealed section of the Interstate Commerce Act 
relevant in deciding whether its continued use of the "adjacent" 
limitation was proper. Congress had required in the Transportation 
Act of 1920 that the domestic-flag ocean carriers file schedules and 
routes with the Commission; list the rates that applied from a given 
port, upon request from a railroad; and reserve space if the railroad 
accepted the rate.268 It further authorized railroads to issue through 
bills of lading. The new section was given little use269 and was re-
pealed in 1940;270 but even then the Commission's jurisdiction 
over foreign commerce authorized it to compel railroads that chose 
to enter into through arrangements with one or a selected few ocean 
carriers271 to enter into "similar arrangements" with other ocean 
carriers. 
On the basis of these statutory changes, and the Supreme Court's 
holding in Missouri Pacific, the Commission concluded in the 1960's 
that not only had Congress removed the word "adjacent" from sec-
tion l(l)(a) for the purpose of promoting intermodal arrangements 
that would be subject to Commission regulation, but it had also for 
a twenty-year period made some of these arrangements mandatory 
and subject to the close supervision of the Commission. By 1940, the 
Congress had returned to a policy of encouraging voluntary inter-
modal arrangements subject to the Commission's supervision. The 
266. Under § 1(6) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1(6) (1970). 
267. 273 U.S. at 345. 
268. Section 25 of the Interstate Commerce Act, which was added by the Transporta-
tion Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 441, 41 Stat. 497, was drafted by Senator Cummins, who 
explained that it was "an effort to coordinate land and ocean traffic" by requiring 
railroads to distribute sailing information throughout the country and to issue through 
bills of lading in a form prescribed by the Commission, "thus affording the inland 
shipper who desires to export an opportunity properly to route and ship his freight." 
59 CONG. REc. 140, 143 (1919). 
269. The section was described as "unnecessary" (H.R. REP. No. 2832, 76th Cong., 
3d Sess. (1940)), and a section that had "never been of much value" (S. REP. No. 433, 
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1939)). 
270. Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, § 14, 54 Stat. 919. 
271. Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, § 8(d), 54 Stat. 910 (codified at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 6(12) (1970)). 
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Commission's awareness of this policy in the 1960's led to new efforts 
by the Commission to promote intermodal traffic. 
C. The New Intermodal Joint Rates 
In April 1969, the Commission advised Congress that it pos-
sessed authority under existing law to accept tariffs establishing joint 
rates in which common carriers subject to its jurisdiction and ocean 
carriers outside its jurisdiction would participate.272 On July 31, 
1969, it initiated a proceeding to determine whether such rates 
should be permitted and, if so, what changes would be necessary in 
the Commission's rules to permit these tariffs to be filed. The pro-
ceeding resulted in a report of the entire Commission, which was 
issued on September 4, 1970.273 
The Commission stated in this proceeding that, notwithstanding 
the 1920 amendment of the statute, which removed the word "ad-
jacent," it had continued to read the statute "as if that word were 
still present."274 It confessed "that this self-imposed restriction on 
jurisdiction over tariffs of joint rates was unfounded," and declared 
that it would now accept such rates for filing in the public tariffs.271i 
If such rates ·were filed, the Commission stated, it would enter such 
orders as might be necessary only against the domestic carriers sub-
ject to its authority, and not against, for example, ocean carriers.270 
Since the Commission's refusal to approve rail-exempt-motor-
carrier joint rates was predicated upon the Commission's former 
attitude toward joint ocean-rail rates, its new decision logically led 
to a re-examination of its stand on such rail-motor tariffs. Thus, 
when the Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad Company 
proposed to publish tariff provisions that temporarily authorized it 
to substitute motor carrier service for rail service on grain shipments 
from various points in Oklahoma to Enid, Oklahoma, the Commis-
sion, permitting a departure from its long-standing practice,277 
stated that the Act 
272. Tariffs Containing Joint Rates & Through Routes for the Transportation of 
Property Betlveen Points in the United States & Points in Foreign Countries, 38'1 
1.C.C. 625, 625-26 (1970). 
273. 337 I.C.C. 625. 
274. 337 I.C.C. at 628. 
275. 337 I.C.C. at 629. 
276. 337 I.C.C. at 629. Orders may be issued only against domestic carriers since 49 
U.S.C. § 1(1) (1970) limits the Commission's jurisdiction over foreign commerce only 
"insofar as such transportation takes place within the United States." 
277. In Substituted Freight Service, 232 I.C.C. 683, 688 (1939), and Substituted 
Service-Charges & Practices of For-Hire Carriers & Freight Fonvarders (Piggyback 
Serv.), 322 I.C.C. 301, 354 (1964), the Commission had said that railroads may not 
enter into through-route, joint-rate arrangements with exempt motor carriers, and that 
June 1972] Transport Rate Regulation 1277 
authorizes the filing of substituted service tariffs contemplating an ar-
rangement voluntarily entered into between railroads and partially 
exempt motor carriers where the shipments ,;vill move on rail billing 
and the railroad remains responsible for the entire through move-
ment.278 
Consequently, the Commission approved the railroad's proposal to 
use whatever exempt motor carriers it could find to perform the 
transportation, to issue its own bill of lading for the transportation, 
and to omit the motor carriers' names in the applicable tariff. 
In another recent proceeding, the Commission has approved the 
filing of through-route, joint-rate arrangements between railroads 
and exempt motor carriers, this time on a broader scale and for 
longer or relatively permanent periods. The Commission has found 
that such joint rates are in the interest of the shipping public and 
are "consistent with the purposes of the act and our now-established 
jurisdiction to entertain such rates so long as they are filed by regu-
lated carriers and the exempt carriers are named in the tariff."279 
From this, it would appear that there is every indication that the 
Commission will condone the increased intermodal use of joint-rate 
tariffs in the future. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The regulation of transport rates has never rested on formulas, 
rules of thumb, or simplistic phrases, such as "cost-based rates." The 
"process of rate-making is essentially empiric"; the Interstate Com-
merce Act charges the agency with "the duty of being responsive to 
the dynamic character of transportation problems."280 The decade 
of the 196O's was indeed a period of many rapid changes in transpor-
tation rates, and the task of fulfilling this mandate was complex. 
The railroad industry in particular experienced the effect of the 
Commission's activity. There were marked changes in its rate struc-
ture as the tendency of the rail rate structure continued to move 
all motor carriers employed in substituted service must be named in the applicable 
tariff. 
When the Commission had held at the beginning of the decade that it lacked 
jurisdiction to accept the joint rates filed by motor carriers in cooperation with ocean 
carriers subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Maritime Commission (Motor Carrier 
Operation in Hawaii, 84 M.C.C. 5, 31 (1960)), Congress had obliged by following the 
ICC recommendation and enacting clarifying legislation in 1962 to permit the filing of 
such rates. Act of Aug. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-595, 76 Stat. 397 (codified at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 216(c)(l970)). 
278. Substitution of Motor Carrier Service for Rail Service-Grain, Special Permis-
sion No. 69-4969 (l.C.C. June 3, 1969). 
279. Substitution of Motor For Rail Serv. &: Publication of Joint Motor-Rail Rates 
on Grains, 341 I.C.C. 88, 101 (1972). 
280. Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 546 (1942). 
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away from value-oriented rates and more toward cost-oriented rates281 
and volume rate reductions. In addition, the railroads suffered a 
noticeable reduction in capacity, which was reflected in the purchase 
of specially equipped and large-capacity railroad cars which were 
largely unavailable for general service. When the Commission has 
been dissatisfied with these tendencies, it has adopted regulations to 
change their course.282 
The Commission's activity was evident also in the development 
of general transportation policy. The Interstate Commerce Act re-
quires that rates be "just" and "reasonable," that the discriminations 
not be "undue," and that the "inherent advantages" of different 
modes be preserved. These policies are not precisely defined; rather, 
their meaning has been developed by the Commission over years of 
regulatory effort. It has often been necessary for the Commission to 
reconcile many conflicting interests in developing these policies, 
something which could not be achieved with strict adherence to cost. 
Furthermore, a policy of strict adherence to cost would have de-
stroyed the policies relating to maximizing traffic through the various 
ports and would not have settled questions related to the preserva-
tion of the inherent service advantages of the various modes. The 
cost of transportation, therefore, was neither an automatic nor a 
complete answer to the problem of providing transportation to the 
shippers of the country at reasonable rates. 
As for motor carriers, the trend in this industry now tends toward 
the closer regulation of profits, and there has also been the appear-
ance of a new potential avenue of relief from unjust interim payment 
of rate increases. The former is the work of the Commission; the 
latter can only be accomplished by the courts. In addition, there is 
new hope for greater intermodal cooperation, which should result 
in new rate reductions. 
I would hope that in view of the Commission's diligent work in 
rate regulation, if I have not shown that the Commission must be 
acquitted of the crime charged by the Study Group Report, at least 
I have shown that the case is for the jury. 
281. A study prepared for the Department of Commerce concluded in 1966 that 
the Commission's regulatory trend was "strongly in the direction of cost-based rates" 
and that future public policy could reasonably result in "less, the same, or more 
intensity of regulation, freedom for pricing initiative, and the use of costs in pricing." 
SYSTEMS .ANALYSIS AND REsEARCH CORPORATION, COST-BASED FREIGHT-RATES: DESIMDIUTY 
AND FEASIBILITY 103, 128 (1966). 
282. See, e.g., Incentive Per Diem Charges-1968, 337 I.C.C. 217 (1970), modified, 
339 I.C.C. 627 (1971), afjd. sub nom. Long Island R.R. v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 
490 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), revd. in part sub nom. Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 322 
F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Fla. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. June 12, 1972) 
(No. 70-279). 
